Prepared pilots have a Plan A as to when and how to land at an airport. The final approach and descent is coordinated with ATC, often with a programmed navigation system, as the pilot continues to execute that plan.
Sometimes – for any number or reasons – pilots have to choose another option: the go-around, and transition from the descent to begin climbing and take another approach at the runway. Go-arounds are uncommon, but not unique.
In nearly all cases, pilots using a go-around are trying to prepare against a poor outcome, which is ultimately the best decision for the passengers and crew. Something wasn’t right, the pilots recognized, and for that a go-around is the best option regardless of the added time or fuel burn that might result.
In its continual efforts to increase aviation safety and to better prepare pilots, FlightSafety International is now working to determine what makes pilots choose go-arounds, and how that can be incorporated into better training.
“A go-around may be perceived by some as less than perfection, when in reality it might be exactly what is needed,” said Richard Meikle, executive vice president of operations and safety for FlightSafety. On the other hand, it should be recognized for what it is: an opportunity to appreciate that the pilot’s actions could have kept everyone safe.
Why Go-Arounds Happen
Go-arounds are uncommon because once an aircraft is set to land for its stabilized approach, the reasons to alter that don’t occur frequently. Why should a pilot change that? It could be that unexpected aircraft or a vehicle is on the runway. Or ATC could request a go-around for spacing between aircraft.
Weather can destabilize an approach with strong downdrafts or poor visibility. Rain, fog or mist can make a go-around necessary because a pilot can’t physically see the runway by a prescribed minimum altitude. Ultimately that go-around might become a diversion to another airport.
Go-around decisions also happen when simply a routine descent changes for whatever reason: the approach is slightly off – too fast or too slow, too high or too low. Even following ATC instructions exactly can mean a situation where the pilot is no longer confident in the approach. Maybe it’s a switch to a different runway, or requests to avoid traffic or maintain a slower or faster speed than normal.
Choosing to follow through with the landing despite the unstable approach means the pilot is facing a difficult task, and one where they have to ask themselves if the runway is long enough or wide enough to handle any complications. If not, they’re potentially risking a runway excursion, where the aircraft leaves the runway in a dangerous fashion on the ground.
Runway excursions usually are the result of a landing continued from an unstable approach that shouldn’t have happened, Meikle said. But less than 2 percent of unstable approaches are altered through a go-around. What FlightSafety is trying to discover is if there’s a reason pilots choose not to do more go-arounds for safety’s sake.
“We have to do more to address the root cause,” Meikle said of runway excursion events in business aircraft “by focusing on the decision-making leading to touchdown in training, we can directly attack the threat in flight operations.” 
Learning Pilot Psychology
FlightSafety has partnered with Presage Group, a world leader in predictive human behavior in the workplace, to study go-around decision making by business aviation pilots. The study, which is still in progress, focuses on two-pilot Gulfstream business jet crews, and builds on a previous study with FlightSafety and Presage that coordinated with Citation Jet Pilots Association.
The Gulfstream pilot study currently under way will offer findings and data to make key recommendations for future FlightSafety courses and curriculum. The results of the Citation pilot study have already been included into new instruction, FlightSafety has said, with great results.
The Gulfstream study offers new data points, partially based on the configuration of the cockpit, where depending on the model, the two pilots may have control yokes in front of them which stay in each other’s peripheral vision, or in the case of the G600 and G650, have side sticks that are out of the field of view of each other.
Control column and side-stick flight might give different results within the study, Meikle said. “By using two different platforms of operation in the study, we’ll see if that factor influences the go-around decision making process.”
Another factor to study vs. the Citation data is the weight of each aircraft, which means Gulfstream pilots usually have to make their go-around decision earlier and higher than Citation. Researchers also want to know if a two-pilot crew makes a difference in the outcome, as well.
Incorporating the Data
FlightSafety is already using real flight data to shape course content and scenarios. It has access to the insights gathered from a partnership with GE Digital, which collects and analyzes anonymized aggregated flight data from more than 1,300 business aircraft.
The Presage Gulfstream study will add to FlightSafety’s exclusive training advantage that prepares pilots beyond theoretical conditions, to real-world scenarios they need to know how to handle. The training can focus even more precisely on stable approach criteria, Meikle said, and then add the psychological factors of the go-around decision making. It all adds to the effectiveness of FlightSafety training, and ultimately a safer aviation environment, which is the ultimate goal.
On the Presage study and enhancing aviation safety through better training, Meikle said: “If just one crew makes the go-around decision that they might not have done otherwise – resulting in a non-event instead of a runway excursion with potentially catastrophic consequences – then we’ve done our job.”