Preliminary Reports
Two Killed During Autorotation Training
Bell 505 Jet Ranger X, July 30, 2024, near Killucan, County Westmeath, Ireland
The pilot-rated student and the instructor conducting his type-rating training both perished when the 2020-model helicopter crashed into a farm field during the sixth of a series of practice autorotations with power recoveries. The aircraft struck with sufficient force to bounce back into the air, clearing a wire fence and hitting the end of an adjacent building at its roof line. Initial examination of the wreckage found only impact damage, with no evidence of any prior malfunction.
The student had flown just over 100 hours in Robinson R44 helicopters in the course of earning his private pilot’s license, which he received five weeks before the accident. During that time, he purchased the Jet Ranger in Malta, re-registered it in the U.S., and had it delivered to Ireland, where it was added to the training organization’s fleet. The 5,253-hour instructor, whose instructor and examiner certificates were issued by the Czech Republic, was contracted to provide type--rating training to four students. The accident occurred on the program’s second day.
Engine Anomalies Disrupt Forest Service Transport
Bell 407, Aug. 2, 2024, Raft River, Idaho
On the third leg of a public-use flight transporting U.S. Forest Service employees from Gerlach, Nevada, to Pocatello, Idaho, the pilot saw the barrier inlet air filter light activate, followed by a gradual increase in the measured gas temperature gauge. The pilot reduced power but the temperature continued to climb, exceeding its redline limit of 779 degrees C. As he looked for a suitable precautionary landing site, engine gauges indicated an overspeed that was not arrested by increasing collective. He therefore attempted an autorotation into a cornfield but, due to the height of the corn, was unable to gauge his elevation above the terrain. The helicopter dropped the final 5 feet and landed hard, causing minor injuries to all four on board.
Citation Destroyed in Attempted Emergency Landing
Cessna Citation 750, Aug. 5, 2024, Jamestown, New York
Both pilots escaped with injuries from a fire that consumed most of the Citation X after it touched down 200 feet short of Runway 25 of the Jamestown Airport, collapsing the landing gear and sliding down and then off the left side of the runway. The accident occurred shortly after departure from Chautauqua County Dunkirk Airport on a Part 91 business flight to Florida’s Fort Lauderdale Executive Airport.
Climbing through 5,000 feet, the copilot noticed a smell of electrical smoke, but the pilot did not. At 8,000 feet, it was noticeable to both pilots, though no smoke was visible.
The flight briefly leveled at 10,000 feet, but the crew did not respond to ATC’s communication to “expect Flight Level 470.”
The Buffalo approach controller then saw that they had reset their transponder code to the emergency code of 7700 and were descending through 7,800 feet. The controller advised that they were directly over Jamestown Airport without response; a few minutes later, he received “very garbled” transmissions that ended with, “We are about to land at Jamestown.”
The first officer told investigators that the pitch trim system began uncommanded nose-down inputs, accelerating the jet to “well over 250 knots.” Master caution, panel segments, and crew alerting system messages illuminated. As he tried to contact the controller, he saw that “Comm 2 had failed, and the Garmin 5000 had big, red X’s.”
Gear-up Landing Destroys King Air
Beech King Air B100, Aug. 13, 2024, Lake Simcoe Regional Aerodrome, Barrie-Orillia, Ontario, Canada
A fire of undetermined origin consumed “the entire upper fuselage and aircraft interior” after the pilots neglected to extend the landing gear during a single-engine approach to a full stop on a company check flight. The check pilot and both pilots on the controls escaped uninjured. While the check pilot spent most of the flight observing from an unbelted divan behind the cockpit, he moved to a forward-facing seat in the rear cabin during takeoffs and landings in order to use a seat belt. During those periods, he communicated with the cockpit using the airplane’s intercom system.
While flying the RNAV approach to Runway 28, the pilots read the before-landing checklist but did not extend the gear. The King Air slid about 2,500 feet after the propellers struck the pavement and came to rest on the runway. Smoke and an electrical smell began emanating from behind the left edge of the instrument panel shortly after it came to a stop. The crew shut down the aircraft and tried unsuccessfully to suppress the fire with an on-board extinguisher before being forced to evacuate.
Final Report
Downwind Landing on Snowy Runway Ended in Overrun
Learjet 55, Jan. 11, 2024, Livingston, Montana
The 31,800-hour captain’s decision to land with a quartering tailwind despite reports of dry snow on the runway culminated in the jet’s running off the end of the runway into a deep ravine, substantially damaging the fuselage and both wings. After breaking out on a GPS approach to Runway 22, the crew was advised that the runway had not been plowed. The snow depth was estimated at a quarter of an inch, and reported winds were from 090 degrees at 14 knots.
The captain landed on Runway 22 and immediately deployed spoilers and thrust reversers while applying the brakes. The jet initially slowed, but halfway down the runway the anti-skid system “was functioning continuously” and its rate of deceleration was decreasing. He tried cycling the thrust reversers, then began cleaning up the airframe before concluding that there was no longer enough room to go around.
The owner of the FBO subsequently estimated the snow depth at “around an inch” and commented that plowing had been “abysmal” that year, leaving windrows and chunks of ice on the runway and delaying several departures.
No notam for runway conditions had been issued. The FAA confirmed that the airport was not required to have a snow and ice removal plan, but grant assurances accompanying funding to provide it with a snowplow held that a notam should be issued if plowing is delayed.
The manufacturer estimated the Learjet’s landing distance on a dry runway at 3,350 feet. Loose snow with no tailwind would increase that to 6,700 feet, well beyond the length of the 5,701-foot runway. The tailwind further increased that to 7,531 feet.
Inadequate Engine Inspection Cited in Huey Accident
Bell UH-1B, June 22, 2022, Logan, West Virginia
The Huey that crashed following engine failure was being inspected under less stringent requirements than should have applied, according to the NTSB.
Damage to the T53-L-11D turboshaft engine’s compressor section, gas-producer turbine, and exhaust diffusor rear bearing cover was not detected in a previous inspection, and following the engine failure, the helicopter ran into powerlines during an attempted forced landing. All six onboard were killed.
The flight was part of the “7th Annual Huey Reunion” celebration held at Logan County Airport in West Virginia. During the event, visitors were invited to fly in the helicopter, and one person could pay a “required” donation of $250 to fly from the right seat for 30 minutes with no experience, according to the NTSB.
The helicopter’s operator, Marpat Aviation, held a special airworthiness certificate in the experimental exhibition category issued by the FAA’s Charleston, West Virginia Flight Standards District Office (FSDO). However, Marpat Aviation “did not hold a living history flight experience exemption for the helicopter,” the NTSB explained, “which would have allowed the helicopter to be operated for compensation.”
Marpat also failed to inform the FAA of its plans to fly the helicopter at the Huey Reunion, which it was required to do as part of operating limitations on the helicopter’s special airworthiness certificate.
As part of the special airworthiness certificate, the FSDO issued operating limitations that included specific inspection standards. These turned out to be the provisions of Appendix D to FAR Part 43. “We found that the inspection standards in Part 43 Appendix D did not have sufficient scope and depth for inspecting former military turbine-powered rotorcraft because the standards comprised generic inspection criteria for aircraft systems and components undergoing annual and 100-hour inspections,” the NTSB wrote.
“We also found that the damage to the engine exhaust diffuser (cracking) and the rear bearing cover (outer flange separation) were significant long-term engine issues that could have been detected if the operator, Marpat Aviation, had used more detailed inspection criteria and more frequent inspection intervals than those in Part 43 Appendix D. The inspection standards in Part 43 Appendix D did not have sufficient scope and depth for inspecting former military turbine-powered rotorcraft, especially given the complex design of typical former military rotorcraft,” the Safety Board continued. “For example, Appendix D stated that a reciprocating aircraft engine needed to be inspected for proper cylinder compression but did not specify critical turbine engine components for inspection, such as an engine compressor or turbine, and the necessary inspection steps to ensure the continued airworthiness for a complex turbine-powered aircraft.”
The probable cause of the accident “was the operator’s failure to adequately inspect the former military turbine-powered helicopter, which allowed an engine issue to progress and result in a loss of engine power and subsequent loss of control after the helicopter struck powerlines during a forced landing.”
The NTSB cited as causal to the accident “the FAA’s inadequate inspection and maintenance standards” for operating former military aircraft under a special airworthiness certificate; the operator using the lesser standards instead of the more rigorous standards, which had been used previously on that helicopter; and inadequate oversight of the operator by the FAA.
In the examination of the engine after the accident, NTSB investigators “found static damage in the compressor section; rotational damage in the gas-producer turbine; and additional damage to the exhaust diffuser, rear bearing cover, No. 2 bearing, and two power turbine blades.” Evidence showed that the main rotor blades didn’t show the significant impact fragmentation that would be expected if they were being powered, thus there was a partial or total loss of power before impact.
Marpat had “no comment” to AIN’s inquiry on the report.