Click Here to View This Page on Production Frontend
Click Here to Export Node Content
Click Here to View Printer-Friendly Version (Raw Backend)
Note: front-end display has links to styled print versions.
Content Node ID: 435770
A Sikorsky S-76D flight crew’s failure to properly identify a private heliport in dark night conditions led to an attempted landing at the wrong location and impact with trees and terrain, according to a newly released NTSB final report. The captain, first officer, and passenger all suffered serious injuries in the August 2025 crash of the helicopter near Round Mountain, Texas.
Investigators found that the flight crew likely misidentified the heliport altogether. The accident site, a heavily wooded area near a recreational vehicle park on private property, was about 1.54 miles north of the intended heliport, with a prominent west-to-east river separating the two locations. The captain reported landing at the heliport between 20 and 25 times in both day and night conditions and said he did not recall experiencing any visual illusions during the accident flight. The first officer had landed there 20 times previously, but only during daytime.
The captain said he compared the map display against the outside visual references to confirm alignment with the heliport, cross-checking his position before continuing the approach, and he believed the two had matched.
The rotorcraft, operated by Paradigm Helicopters, was on its way from Dallas Love Field (KDAL) to a private ranch heliport near Dripping Springs, Texas, with one passenger. According to the report, the captain opted against an IFR flight to the heliport, citing previous issues with the helicopter’s autopilot system and a possible concern about losing control in instrument meteorological conditions. An instrument approach had been loaded into the helicopter’s flight management system (FMS), but was never activated. Each pilot had an Apple iPad mounted in the cockpit running ForeFlight, with the heliport’s coordinates loaded into the app.
During the approach, the captain texted the ranch manager by cell phone to confirm that the heliport’s floodlights were activated, while the first officer remotely activated the heliport’s green ground lights by radio frequency. Both pilots reported seeing green lights ahead. The first officer extended the landing gear, completed the before-landing checklist, and then turned his attention outside the helicopter to look for the heliport. The captain delayed switching on the helicopter’s landing lights until they were closer to the heliport, wanting to avoid glare reflecting off moisture and haze in the beams.
As the captain began maneuvering for landing, he lost outside visual references and transitioned to the flight instruments. The first officer, looking inside the cockpit, saw the radar altimeter indicating 20 feet. Before he could call for a go-around, the helicopter’s terrain awareness and warning system issued an alert, and the helicopter impacted trees and terrain. The rotorcraft, which sustained substantial damage to the fuselage, main rotor system, tail boom, empennage, and tail rotor system, came to rest on its right side. The captain reported no pre-impact mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airframe or the helicopter’s two Pratt & Whitney Canada PW210S turboshaft engines that would have precluded normal operation.
Meteorological data showed dark night conditions at the accident site, with scattered clouds at 500 feet agl and 7 miles of visibility recorded at a weather station 14 nm away, with temperature and dew point both recorded at 23 degrees C. While the flight crew reported checking weather data at several en-route locations, they did not report checking conditions specifically near the heliport. The helicopter’s emergency locator transmitter, though installed, did not activate following the accident.
Paradigm Helicopters told investigators the accident could have been prevented by implementing a night-vision-goggle program for operations away from established airports. The NTSB did not issue new safety recommendations as a result of the investigation but noted that the accident fits the pattern addressed in Safety Alert SA-033, “Landing at the Wrong Airport,” which urges flight crews to verify their position using all available resources before attempting to land, particularly at night.