Israel's UAVs Find New Roles as Hunters and Data Gatherers

Outside of the U.S., Israel is the country that has the most experience in developing and deploying UAVs. As European industrials and operators play catch-up, they can learn from Israeli practice that has been forged on the anvil of war with neighbors as well as internal conflict. In a recent presentation in London, Dr. Tamir Libel described the evolution of UAVs in the Israeli Air Force (IAF).

It was during the largely-forgotten ‘War of Attrition’ with Egypt along the Suez Canal in 1969-70, that one intelligence officer tired of the lengthy 24-hour cycle of tasking, processing and dissemination associated with the IAF’s RF-4 Phantom reconnaissance missions. Besides, those flights were increasingly hazardous, as Egypt deployed more and more SA-2/3 surface-to-air missiles. So he fitted a camera to a radio-controlled drone and flew it over the Egyptian side of the canal.

By the end of this conflict, Israel decided to acquire Firebee and Chukar UAVs from the U.S. Using these, the first IAF UAV squadron performed well in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The loss of many IAF combat aircraft to lethal SA-6 SAM batteries in that war spurred the development of Israel’s first indigenous reconnaissance UAVs–the IAI Scout and the Tadiran Mastiff. By the time of the First Lebanon War in 1982, they provided feedback in real-time, and proved valuable in the IAF’s efforts to counter Syrian-operated air defenses in Lebanon.

Thereafter, the IAF adapted its UAV operations to the low-intensity conflict in the occupied territories and Lebanon. In the latter, Hezbollah was proving adept at camouflaging its forces, and Israel required surveillance capabilities that only UAVs could provide. By 1992, the IAF’s UAVs were equipped with laser designators to mark Hezbollah targets, including those on the move, for strikes by fighters and attack helicopters.

By the time of the Second Intifada on the West Bank in 2000-07, which coincided with a suicide bombing campaign in Israeli cities, UAVs were integral to the Israeli state’s response. Nevertheless, Dr. Libel said, the IAF leadership remained “somewhat skeptical” about the contribution that UAVs could make, and was reluctant to assign core missions to them, or develop doctrine that fully embraced their potential. In the field, however, lower echelons were steadily gaining expertise in coordination between UAV, fixed-wing aircraft and helicopter operations. And the domestic security service Shin Bet certainly recognized the potential for UAVs in the counter-terrorism role.

Since 2006, the main focus of Israel’s UAV operations has been the Gaza Strip, during Operations Cast Lead (2008-09); Pillar of Defense (2012); and Protective Edge (2014). During these campaigns, joint planning and training between the Army, the IAF, and other Israeli intelligence and security agencies has accelerated. So has the government’s use of UAV imagery to boost public morale, for instance through postings to the Israeli Defence Forces’ YouTube channel. Dr. Libel also noted that data collected by UAVs is increasingly used to provide legal justification for military actions. However, he said, there is not much public discussion on the morality of using UAVs for attack missions, with the accompanying risk of civilian casualties. Indeed, Israel has never officially confirmed that its UAVs are armed. Nevertheless, Dr. Libel added, the persistent and real-time intelligence gathering that is possible with UAVs does decrease the collateral damage in the dense urban terrains of the Gaza Strip and West Bank.

Helicopter Stand-ins

Today, UAVs often replace attack helicopters on close air support missions, according to Dr. Libel. The IAF’s AH-1 Cobra squadron was deactivated last year at Palmachim airbase–the same one that houses three of the four UAV squadrons, and the UAV School. One of these squadrons operates IAI Heron 1s, another has IAI Heron 2s and the larger Heron TP, and two have the Elbit Hermes 450. Dr. Libel cannot confirm whether Elbit’s latest Hermes 900 product has entered IAF service. The School–established in 2002–has helped develop a UAV concept and doctrine that was previously missing in the IAF. It also ensures that the IAF’s UAV operators are fully conversant with the army’s equipment and procedures.

Israel has avoided the inter-service arguments about ‘roles and missions’ that has dogged the deployment of UAVs in the American and some other armed forces. In 2000, the Chief of the General Staff in Israel decided that the IAF would operate all UAVs. Since then, mini-UAVs have been developed, and these can be deployed by Army battalions. But according to Dr. Libel, Israel has not yet developed a new ‘theory of war’ that fully embraces the potential of UAVs, and military robotics in general. The prospects for moving unmanned platforms from a supporting to a leading role “seem bleak,” he said. o

Dr. Tamir Libel is a visiting scholar in the Department of Political Science at the University of Trier and non-resident fellow at the Centre for War Studies, University College Dublin. Additional material used above is taken by AIN from an article that Dr. Libel wrote for the RUSI Journal, April 2015, with co-author Emily Boulter.