The pilot of a Cessna Citation II that crashed near French Valley Airport (F70) at 4:14 a.m. PST in Murrieta, California, descended below the decision altitude without the required visual cues, causing the July 8, 2023, controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) accident that killed all six aboard, the NTSB has concluded. French Valley Airport did not have a control tower, and while a cockpit voice recorder (CVR) was on board, “the CVR did not contain data from the accident flight and none of the recovered audio was pertinent to the investigation.”
Toxicology testing revealed that the pilot had “very low levels” of blood ethanol from an unknown source, according to the report, which the NTSB concluded was unlikely to have significantly impaired performance. A pilot-rated right-seat occupant also had ethanol concentrations that “were high” in all tested samples (between 0.109% and 0.365% according to the toxicology results), but the report notes that decomposition made it impossible to determine the source or whether it was material to the event.
FAR 91.17 requires a minimum of eight hours between consumption of alcohol and serving as a pilot or crewmember on a civil aircraft, and limits blood alcohol content to 0.04%. It also specifies that no one may be carried on board “who appears to be intoxicated” or under the influence of drugs.
The Coroner’s Bureau of Riverside County Sheriff’s Office performed an examination at the accident scene for both the pilot and right-seat occupant (at 12:20 p.m. and 12:47 p.m., respectively, on the date of the accident), and the deputy coroner noted a strong smell of alcohol when inspecting both, according to the medical factual memorandum. Additionally, the document noted that ethanol can form in postmortem blood samples due to microbial processes and that trauma can spread the microbes.
According to the report, the Citation departed French Valley at about 9:18 p.m. the previous evening and landed at Las Vegas Harry Reid International Airport (KLAS). “The airplane departed on the return flight back to F70 about 6 hours later,” the report states. Passengers onboard during the accident flight were three women and one man, ages unknown.
Twenty-seven minutes into the flight, the pilot began a descent to their destination; the weather conditions at French Valley had been deteriorating. Within just a few minutes, according to the report, a fog rolled in, changing visibility from 10 statute miles to 300 feet overcast with 3/4 mile visibility, and then to 1/2 statute mile visibility with fog. At 3:44 a.m., the pilot requested IFR cancellation, and the controller acknowledged this and advised that he had no weather information for F70. “The pilot responded and advised that he had the weather and landing information for F70. About 0351, and about 25 miles north of F70, the pilot reported that he had received updated weather and requested an IFR pickup for the RNAV (GPS) Runway 18 approach at F70.”
However, the report goes on to note, “A search of archived information indicated that the accident pilot did not request weather information from Leidos Flight Service. The pilot did have an account through Foreflight and filed a flight plan, but no weather imagery was viewed in Foreflight.”
Two instrument approaches for Runway 18 were conducted by the crew. During the first attempt, the airplane’s airspeed was fast, and it “leveled off near the decision altitude for several seconds” before the pilot initiated a missed approach. A Mode 4 “too-low gear” alert was triggered during the missed approach, consistent with low-altitude gear retraction. The crew was cleared for a second approach, during which the airplane again descended below the minimums—7/8 mile visibility was required—as visibility fell to half a mile in fog. About 810 feet short of the runway threshold, the jet struck terrain.
The final ADS-B return showed the aircraft flying at 128 knots ground speed and approximately 100 feet above ground level. In the last three seconds of recorded data, its descent rate increased sharply to approximately 2,320 feet per minute.
Investigators found no mechanical anomalies that would have prevented normal operation. Configuration of the aircraft was gear down, flaps fully extended, and all major components were found at the accident site. Lighting systems at F70, including the runway PAPI, REILs, and pilot-controlled lighting, were found operational during post-accident inspection.
The NTSB cited the crew’s decision to descend without “the appropriate runway visual reference(s) distinctively identified” and below the minimum visibility required for the instrument approach as the probable cause of the accident. Contributing factors included crew fatigue during the circadian low window and reduced situational awareness. The FAA’s Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge identifies “Duck-under syndrome”—a tendency to descend below minimums to complete an approach—and “Get-there-itis” as common operational hazards in such scenarios.