Story ID: 004
Business Aircraft Accident Reports: October 2025
By: David Jack Kenny
Caption: Preliminary and final accident reports, October 2025
Word Count: 1711
Preliminary ReportsConquest I Suffers Double Engine Failure
Cessna 425, July 17, 2025, Round Rock, Arizona
About 1.5 hours into an instructional flight from Denver, Colorado’s Centennial Airport (KAPA) to Phoenix, Arizona Deer Valley Airport (KDVT) at FL260, a loud noise from the left engine was followed by “an immediate and total loss of engine power.” The right engine then lost power while the pilots attempted to troubleshoot the left. They declared an emergency and attempted to restart the right engine, only to experience a complete electrical failure. Both pilots escaped without injury after a forced landing in open desert that separated the main landing gear and caused substantial damage to the left wing.
Departure Crash Kills Solo Pilot
Piper PA-46-500TP, July 20, 2025,Lititz, Pennsylvania
The instrument-rated private pilot was killed when the single-engine turboprop abruptly pitched down and crashed just after takeoff from Runway 08 at Lancaster, Pennsylvania Regional Airport (KLNS). The IFR flight’s destination was State College Regional Airport (KUNV), also in Pennsylvania. Line personnel at KLNS pulled the airplane from its hangar and topped it off with 74 gallons of jet-A before the pilot’s arrival. He reached the airplane shortly after and performed a short preflight inspection, started the engine, and correctly read back his IFR and taxi clearances.
Following a three-minute wait for IFR release, he was cleared for takeoff. Preliminary ADS-B data showed that as the airplane climbed through 650 feet passing the runway’s departure end at a ground speed of 136 knots, it abruptly pitched down, descending at 1,600 feet per minute. Nine seconds later, it crashed into a corn field one-quarter mile beyond the threshold. The estimated time from liftoff to impact was just 20 seconds. The estimated angle of impact was 39 degrees.
The fuselage came to rest 164 feet beyond an impact crater measuring 11 feet long, six feet wide, and 20 inches deep. The propeller was found 60 feet forward and to the right of the crater and exhibited rotational damage, including the separation of one of the four blades and midspan fractures of two others. The left wing also separated and was fractured into multiple pieces. There was a strong aroma of jet fuel throughout the debris field, with fuel blighting on the corn stalks.
Prevailing weather included three-knot winds from 200 degrees with five miles of visibility in mist under layers of broken clouds at 400 and 900 feet. Press reports described the pilot as a physician with “decades” of flight experience, who was also vice president of the Northeast Chapter of the Flying Physicians Association. His most recent third-class medical application listed 2,350 hours of flight experience.
Two Fatalities in Wire Strike
Hughes 369D, Aug. 7, 2025, East Alton, Illinois
The pilot and lineman working to install orange marker balls on a power line spanning the Mississippi River were killed when their helicopter crashed onto the deck of a moored barge, sparking a fire that consumed most of the aircraft. A witness on the barge’s tugboat reported that the lineman was standing on the left skid, secured by a safety harness, as he attempted to attach the marker. On the second approach, the helicopter’s tail appeared to strike the line, causing a partial separation of the tail boom. The helicopter then swung until the front fuselage hit the wire, causing a shower of sparks, and then crashed onto the barge.
One main rotor blade was found about 150 feet from the main wreckage; a 7-foot section of a second blade was found 176 feet away. The remaining main rotor blades and the aft section of the tail boom, including the tail rotor, were not located and are presumed to have fallen into the river. Investigators plan to conduct a search of the river bottom using side-scan sonar.
Final ReportsProcedural Lapses Preceded Fatal Hypoxia Accident
Gulfstream 695A, April 11, 2023, 55 km southeast of Cloncurry Airport, Queensland, Australia
The operator of the Turbo Commander that was destroyed after an uncontrolled descent from FL280 was found to have repeatedly failed to formally log known defects in the pressurization systems of the accident aircraft and others of similar models, and did not “communicate it to the safety manager, undertake a risk assessment of the issue, or provide explicit procedures to pilots for managing it.” 
Instead, they continued to operate the aircraft, relying on short descents to lower altitudes and use of the emergency oxygen supply to fly at altitudes where pressurization or supplemental oxygen was required. Analysis of the pilot’s recorded communications with air traffic control showed “significant and progressive impairment…[that] included errors, slowed responses, misarticulations, and eventually a failure to respond,” indicative of the pilot’s incapacitation by hypoxia.
The crash occurred during the cruise portion of an IFR flight from Toowoomba to an area north of Mount Isa where two cameramen were to perform line scanning of fire zones north of the peak. Forty-five minutes after takeoff the pilot requested and received clearance to descend from FL280 to FL150, where it remained for six minutes before returning to FL280. About one hour later, with the airplane level at FL280, radio contact was lost and the flight began to stray from its assigned route. Multiple attempts to re-establish it, including using alternate frequencies and relaying messages via other aircraft, were unsuccessful. 
After nearly an hour ATC reached the pilot via his cell phone and found his speech “slow and flat.” Radio contact was made 10 minutes later and the pilot asserted that the airplane’s pressurization system was functioning normally. His communications, initially “clear and concise,” began to slow again during the next 10 minutes, and he misidentified Mount Isa first as “Ball” and then “Gordon.” He did not respond to the next frequency change, and no further transmissions were received.
Four minutes later the airplane began to slow from 236 knots without descending. At an airspeed of 138 knots it departed controlled flight, entering a tight counterclockwise turn at an increasing rate of descent. As it passed through 10,500 feet, its flight path changed to a clockwise helical descent consistent with an aerodynamic spin, maintaining an average descent rate of 13,500 feet per minute until impact.
Low Approach in Turbulence Causes Tree Strike
Pilatus PC-12, Jan. 16, 2024, Saint-Barthélemy
A lower-than-recommended altitude in gusty winds led the left wing of the single--engine turboprop to strike trees on final approach to the famously challenging Runway 10 of Saint-Barthélemy Airport (TFFJ). The ferry flight from Puerto Rico’s Luiz Munoz de San Juan International Airport (TJSJ) crossed the Col de la Tourmente, the highest terrain under the approach path, within 16 feet of the ground, when turbulence caused a sudden left roll. The left wing sheared tree branches on the summit; right aileron input by the pilot flying then brought the right wing within seven feet of the ground. The pilot subsequently landed without further incident.
Saint-Barthélemy’s single runway is oriented 10/28 and measures 646 by 18 meters (2,119 by 59 feet) with a 2% downslope on Runway 10. Access is restricted to authorized pilots flying aircraft with approved landing performance. The Runway 10 approach requires a steep descent to the threshold after crossing the 130-foot Col at or above 155 feet. Data recovered from the onboard Garmin navigation system showed that the accident flight may have been as low as 140 feet at that point.
Hydraulic Failure, Inexperience
Fairchild SA227-DC, Aug. 12, 2024, Perth Airport, Western Australia
The limited experience of the trainee first officer led the captain to assume the duties of both pilot flying and pilot monitoring after a hydraulic system failure. The charter flight from Forrestania was about to initiate its descent to Perth when first the right and then the left hydraulic pressure annunciators illuminated. The captain requested holding vectors; during the hold, he calculated the approach speed and distance required for a no-flap landing and supervised the first officer’s performance of a manual gear extension, which uses pressure from the accumulators of the braking system’s separate hydraulic circuit. He also requested a tug to pull the aircraft to the ramp.
After landing safely on Runway 24, the captain stopped the airplane on Taxiway A. Unable to see the tug or establish direct communications, he tested the brakes, detected some effectiveness, and chose to taxi to the ramp unassisted. Approaching their hangar, the airplane picked up speed on a slight downslope; both pilots applied full braking to no effect. The captain briefly engaged reverse thrust, then shut down both engines and feathered the propellers. The right wingtip and propeller struck the hangar. There were no injuries to either pilot or any of the four passengers. The hydraulic failure was traced to a stress crack in the hydraulic line’s union flare.
Pilot Overcontrol Faulted in Runway Excursion
De Havilland Canada DHC-6-300, Oct. 19, 2024, Kairik Airport, Papua New Guinea
The pilot’s overcorrection after misaligning the nose wheel before the takeoff run led the twin-engine turboprop to depart the left side of the runway and run into a drainage ditch, striking the left wing and pivoting the airplane until the nose struck an embankment. Both pilots and all three passengers evacuated the aircraft without injury after the pilots shut down the engines.
The Accident Investigation Commission (AIC) found that following a tight 180-degree turn from the taxiway to Runway 05 using the tiller, the pilots advanced the throttles for takeoff without making a 3-meter (10-foot) forward roll at taxi speed to confirm the nose wheel’s alignment with the runway centerline required by the manufacturer. Initially, the Twin Otter veered right. The crew responded with both left rudder and asymmetric thrust, overcontrolling the aircraft into a sharp left turn. They unsuccessfully attempted to stop the airplane using both braking and reverse thrust as it departed the runway onto wet grass. It came to a stop following the collision with the embankment.
The AIC found that the operator’s standard operating procedures did not include the forward roll nosewheel alignment check that was mandated by the manufacturer. In addition to correcting this discrepancy, their recommendations to the operator had included “improved flight crew training and CRM currency.”