Flight times for Russian airlines in general, and for European carriers operating services to the Far East, have increased markedly after Russia’s February 24 invasion of Ukraine and the widespread imposition of airspace and landing bans that quickly followed Russia’s unilateral action.
From February 24 until March 8—the date from which Rosaviatsiya (Russia’s Federal Air Transport Agency) instructed all Russian carriers to end all international flights except those to Russian ally Belarus—the average en route duration of international flights by Russian carriers jumped from approximately 3 hours and 50 minutes to about 4 hours and 20 minutes, according to data from flight-tracking service FlightAware. The average duration of Russian international flights climbed again to 4 hours and 50 minutes on March 3 but subsequently fell to about 4 hours and 20 minutes through March 7.
FlightAware’s data also shows the number of cancellations of flights to, from, and within Russia rocketed even before Russia began its invasion of Ukraine and have remained at very high daily levels ever since. In the week ending Sunday, February 20, cancellations of Russian flights soared from 19 the previous week to 558, and more than doubled in the following week, ending February 27, to 1,140.
According to the FlightAware data, in those weeks, the total number of scheduled flights to, from, and within Russia fell noticeably, from a typical low-season total of 13,829 for the week ending February 20 to 12,615 the following week.
The statistics aren’t surprising given that airlines based in the European Union, the UK, the U.S, Canada, Japan, South Korea, and several other nations no longer fly to Russia. But Russian carriers have also felt the effects of Rosaviatsiya’s new ban on their operation of international flights, reportedly implemented to avoid seizure and repossession of aircraft leased by Russian carriers from EU-based lessors upon landing at airports in countries other than Russia.
High levels of cancellations of scheduled flights to, from, and within Russia persist on a daily basis, FlightAware’s data shows. From February 22 to February 24 the daily flight cancellation level rose from basically zero to nearly 220 and it peaked at about 250 on March 4 before falling to about 80 on March 7. Meanwhile, the total number of scheduled flights each day to, from, and within Russia fell from about 2,000 on February 23 to about 1,700 on March 7.
While the overflight bans imposed by a sizable and still-growing group of nations have most affected Russian carriers, Russia’s retaliatory overflight bans have had a distinct impact on the flight schedules of European airlines as a group.
George Ferguson, Bloomberg Intelligence senior aerospace/defense and airline analyst, noted in an IBA Group webinar convened on March 2 regarding the effects of the Ukraine crisis on the aviation industry, that Russia’s overflight ban against the West has upset Finnair’s entire route and business strategy.
Normally, Finnair’s strategy takes advantage of Helsinki’s northerly location and relative proximity to Far East destinations allowing the carrier to operate a busy and successful hub connecting passengers flying between the Far East and Southeast Asia and Western Europe. But it relies strongly on Finnair’s ability to fly great circle routings over Russia between Helsinki and destinations such as Tokyo, Seoul, and Hong Kong—which it cannot do at present.
More generally, all Western European carriers are experiencing longer routings to the Far East and Southeast Asia destinations. For instance, AIN’s own research of flight times reported by Flightradar24.com for six daily Lufthansa flights to Asian destinations shows that all felt some effect of Russia’s overflight ban.
Before the overflight ban, Lufthansa’s flight LH716 from Frankfurt to Tokyo Haneda was in the air for 10 hours, 45 minutes to 11 hours, 30 minutes on any given day depending on wind and weather conditions. But now, LH716’s flight time ranges from 12 hours, 20 minutes to 12 hours, 50 minutes on any given day. LH712, from Frankfurt to Seoul Incheon, which previously experienced flight times ranging from 9 hours, 50 minutes to 10 hours, 40 minutes, now sees flight times ranging from 11 hours, 25 minutes to 11 hours, 45 minutes.
LH778, from Frankfurt to Singapore, is taking up to 40 minutes longer en route, while LH772 between Frankfurt and Bangkok is seeing en route flight times about 25 to 30 minutes longer than before Russia’s overflight ban. Lufthansa’s flights from Frankfurt to New Delhi and Mumbai now take approximately 20 minutes longer in the air than before, though the carrier’s flight LH630 from Frankfurt to Dubai has seen no effect, its flight time remaining at 5 hours, 30 minutes.
Coming at a time when business traffic and fare yields remain suppressed by the lingering effects of the Covid-19 pandemic on commercial aviation, the increased flight times—and consequent increased fuel-burn expense—have hurt Europe’s airlines. Ferguson noted that even before Russia’s overflight ban came into effect, SAS had been considering invoking bankruptcy protection to reorganize and Air France/KLM prepared to seek more government aid to help it keep afloat.
The rapidly increasing cost of jet fuel has compounded the adverse cost and traffic effects of longer flight routings and flight times on Europe’s airlines. With crude oil prices trending upward as the U.S. and UK ban imports of oil from Russia, reaching a 13-year high overnight on March 7, and jet fuel hitting a $3.61 per gallon spot price in New York Monday, nobody can say with any confidence that in the near future jet fuel prices won’t exceed the $3.89 all-time peak they experienced in 2008.
Meanwhile, gasoline prices in the U.S. have risen through $4 a gallon and are higher still in Europe. According to Ferguson, not only is there a danger—in a business environment where leisure traffic is predominant and fares are low—airlines will soon have to try to levy an extra 14 percent to 20 percent surcharge merely to recoup their increased fuel costs, but the increased costs of gasoline could hurt airline passenger traffic.
In general, Ferguson believes, ultra-low-cost carriers such as Ryanair, Easyjet, Wizzair, Frontier Airlines, Spirit Airlines, and Allegiant Travel appear better placed than the big “legacy” mainline carriers to handle the forces pressuring their businesses in an environment of rising oil, gasoline, and jet fuel costs. Their overhead costs are lower than those of the hub carriers, their business models allow for stripped-down fares, and their non-hub route networks are less exposed to lost business traffic.
“[As a legacy carrier] you need cash flow—you can’t shut everything down,” said Ferguson. “If you’re a United or a British Airways, ultra-low-cost carriers can lower fares more than you and they can still access capital markets.”