International operations and security specialists are warning that aircraft flying over Iraq near the Iranian border are being targeted with fake GPS signals that are leading to navigation failures.
OpsGroup issued a “Level 1” risk alert citing 12 separate reports involving aircraft ranging from an Embraer Praetor 600, Bombardier Challenger 650, Gulfstream G650, and Dassault Falcon 8X to an Embraer 190 and Boeing 737 and 777.
“A troubling new development in en route airspace is emerging: aircraft are being targeted with fake GPS signals, quickly leading to complete loss of navigational capability,” OpsGroup warned, adding that this type of spoofing has not been seen before. In most cases, the inertial reference system (IRS) has become unusable, VOR/DME sensor inputs fail, the aircraft UTC clock fails, and crews have requested vectors from ATC to navigate.
Most of the reports have occurred in the past week, and Ops Group said this has occurred on Airway UM688 in Iraq.
OpsGroup said the concerns from this are multifold, including that it is happening over an already high-risk area and that “the potential for this type of event to be seen elsewhere is now shown to be possible.” It added that most crews do not have adequate procedures to deal with GPS spoofing and will be surprised at how quickly it impacts navigation systems.
Security specialist Dyami explained that this is different from GPS jamming, in which the signal is interrupted to the degree that it is unusable. With spoofing, a false GPS signal is broadcast, causing GPS systems to indicate false positioning without warning to the pilots. This false GPS signal is so strong and has enough integrity that it fools aircraft systems and “will render an aircraft's IRS unusable in minutes.” The spoofing has resulted in up to an 80-nm deviation, Dyami noted.
In most aircraft, GPS is integrated into the navigational systems and lack a standalone IRS system. Dyami advised that if crews do not have contingency procedures on such situations, there are a few mitigation steps that can be taken before and during the flight, including checking FIR notams for reported spoofing, performing a full IRS alignment if entering an area with elevated risk, and knowing the typical sensor hierarchy for FMS position. Crews should also consider de-selecting GPS sensor input if the option is available.
In addition, crews should ensure they have the correct time on their personal devices and watches and, when flying through areas with reported GPS spoofing, log positions at regular intervals. If navigation accuracy is degraded, inform air traffic control.