A panel of safety experts established to address a series of serious runway incursions at U.S. airports has called for “urgent action” to improve safety in the national airspace system (NAS).
Political gridlock, government shutdowns, inconsistent funding, air traffic controller shortages, and outdated technology are among the issues “rendering the current level of safety unsustainable,” the FAA’s NAS Safety Review Team (SRT) said in its final report. The confluence of these issues is eroding safety margins, according to the report.
“Generally, the (FAA) Air Traffic Organization employs robust policies, procedures, and programs to manage safety risk and enjoys a just safety culture,” the report stated. “However, the FAA continues to be asked to do more with less in an already strained system, and the series of serious incidents in early 2023 illuminate significant challenges to the provision and safety oversight of air traffic services.”
A major problem identified by the safety team includes a “dire shortage of air traffic controllers.” Overtime use is at an all-time high within the FAA; this leads to fatigue, more absenteeism, and lower productivity. “The lack of an adequate workforce is a problem 40 years in the making,” according to the report. “It has a trickle-down effect that creates several threats to the flying public.”
Another daunting task, as recommended by the panel, is to provide more consistent funding to the agency and isolate it from government shutdowns.
Almost as a testament to the SRT's concerns, the report came as Congress has been in the midst of a series of stopgap funding bills government-wide—including for the FAA, as well as temporary extensions of the agency’s authorization. Lawmakers are facing deadlines this month to either continue these temporary measures or to agree upon long-term FAA reauthorization and full fiscal year 2024 funding.
The independent SRT was formed in April 2023 as part of a multi-pronged effort the FAA had undertaken to delve into a spate of high-profile close calls. The events became so pressing that the acting administrator at the time, Billy Nolen, assembled a rare industry-wide safety summit in March 2023.
Led by former FAA Administrator Michael Huerta, the SRT also included Space Shuttle astronaut and former NASA administrator Charles Bolden, former National Transportation Safety Board chair Robert Sumwalt, former FAA chief operating officer David Grizzle, former National Air Traffic Controllers Association executive v-p Patricia Gilbert, and former Air Line Pilots Association president Tim Canoll.
Huerta, who served as FAA administrator under presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump, told reporters, “There are no short-term easy fixes to address many of these challenges; addressing risk in the NAS requires the FAA, the administration, Congress, and others across the industry working together collaboratively.”
Huerta cautioned that progress would require significant patience, collaboration, and investment. “But I think it’s important to recognize that, for the most part, these are not silver bullets or quick fixes," he said. "What it really requires is a concerted effort on the part of all stakeholders to work together to provide the resources and to provide what the agency needs to carry out its critical safety mission.”
A Roadmap for Change
The published report provides a roadmap for current FAA Administrator Michael Whitaker to make changes and improve the agency’s air traffic organization. Whitaker was confirmed by the U.S. Senate on Oct. 27, 2023. The administrator position was previously vacant for 18 months.
Whitaker served as the deputy FAA administrator from 2013 to 2016; he is no stranger to Washington D.C. or the agency. As the SRT’s report was published, he said, “Aviation is safe because we are continuously looking for ways to improve. The safety review team made some excellent recommendations, and we are adopting some of them immediately.” Whitaker continued by stating, “We appreciate the team’s time and expertise to help us pursue our goal of zero serious close calls.”
True to his word, with the ink barely dry on the report, Whitaker and the FAA have taken immediate action to address air traffic controller staffing levels by providing additional support to collegiate training initiatives, more training slots at the FAA Academy, advanced training systems, and control tower simulators. Most importantly, the agency has taken steps to improve its safety culture by providing direct safety reporting from the Air Traffic Safety Oversight Service to the FAA administrator and aviation safety associate administrator. The safety panel identified this as a process integrity issue in its findings.
Before the SRT report was issued, the agency did preemptively take some action to reduce the risk of runway incursions, including $200 million in funding to reconfigure taxiways and improve runway lighting at several large and small airports. Additionally, the FAA issued a safety bulletin to cockpit crews and airlines stressing the need for vigilance during departure, arrival, and taxiing.
The safety review team’s final report contained 24 recommendations that are classified into four interrelated categories: process integrity; staffing; facilities, equipment, and technology; and funding.
Funding: Follow the Money
Several interrelated funding challenges, according to the safety panel, negatively affect the FAA’s ability to deliver critical air traffic services in an efficient and timely manner to the industry and the traveling public. The panel found that inadequate and inconsistent funding issues are impacting everything from staffing to facilities and affect nearly every other issue at the agency. The experts stress that aviation is still safe, but efficiency is suffering and making the system “unsustainable over the long-term.”
The solution, according to the safety team, not only involves more money but more consistent funding to the agency, especially when faced with government shutdowns. In recent years, Congress has increased FAA funding, but much of it has gone toward airport improvements and not necessarily toward flight safety.
Primary funding for the FAA is through the Airport and Airway Trust Fund (AATF), which receives revenues from excise taxes paid by NAS users. The main contributors are taxes collected on airline passenger tickets, air cargo waybills, and aviation fuel purchases. Revenues deposited in the AATF are subject to congressional appropriations and are included in the federal budget. In addition to the AATF, FAA operations are supported by a general fund that traditionally is a small fraction of the contributions from the AATF.
The SRT argues that revamping how the FAA’s primary funding source (the AATF) collects and distributes revenue is necessary. As an example, AATF tax rates have not been updated since 1990. Likewise, there has been a significant evolution in aviation business models; AATF does not collect excise taxes from commercial space, UAS, or advanced mobility operators. In addition, ancillary airline fees, such as those charged for checked baggage, ticket changes, and on-board food sales, are not subject to the tax.
The most pressing issue related to the AATF’s output is that it is still subject to appropriations and to federal budgetary caps on government expenditures despite, according to the report, “being collected from, and intended for, aviation.”
One solution, according to the safety team, is to have Congress exempt appropriations funded by the AATF for the FAA facilities and equipment and operations accounts from federal budgetary caps up to the amount of revenue received into the AATF the previous year. The operations account funds day-to-day work and should rely on aviation user fees and become a “self-sustaining government service.” Updating the funding sources for the AATF would ensure that the FAA is not affected by government shutdowns.
The recurring gridlock on Capitol Hill—including in recent months surrounding appropriations and reauthorization—negatively affects FAA employees and aviation safety. The recurring government gridlock is making it harder for the FAA to do its job, and if this continues, the safety panel warns, it could have long-term repercussions and increased safety risks.
The report states, “This stop-and-start process in Congress has resulted in the disruption of critical activities, notably the hiring and training of air traffic controllers. It has also slowed down the implementation of key technology modernization programs, delayed thousands of flights, and held up billions of dollars of airport infrastructure investments.” According to the safety experts, “This situation makes it extremely difficult for the FAA to effectively conduct long-term business planning and execution.”
Case in point, air traffic controller staffing has been significantly impacted by government shutdowns. In 2013, sequestration cuts and a 16-day shutdown suspended hiring for 10 months. Training at the FAA Academy was suspended during the shutdown.
In 2018 and 2019, a 35-day partial government shutdown led to the suspension of air traffic controller hiring and training. Combined with the pandemic, which closed the FAA Academy for four months, hiring and training for approximately two of the last 10 years has been lost, according to the report. “These hiring slots and positions (nearly 1,600 controllers) cannot be recaptured.”
Staffing and Training
Staffing made up nearly half of the safety review team’s recommendations. Today, the FAA has 1,000 fewer top-tier certified professional controllers (CPCs) than it had in 2012. This, according to the report, reflects no change in the number of air traffic facilities and an “increased complexity of the airspace.”
The panel found this to be problematic: “If unaddressed, the Air Traffic Organization (ATO) will be unable to maintain current capacity, let alone expand and modernize the system. The understaffing that currently exists within the ATO places additional strain on the system, further eroding the margin of safety and increasing risks.”
The staffing issue is partially attributed to a massive air traffic controller retirement wave that began in 2005. These individuals were mostly hired after the PATCO air traffic controller strike in 1981. This was most recently exacerbated by the previously mentioned government shutdowns and global pandemic as well as an increase in attrition in 2021 and 2022.
The single FAA Academy in Oklahoma City has created a bottleneck in training enough controllers to address the shortage. The safety team has recommended increasing the throughput at the training center by expanding the capacity in Oklahoma City, adding more instructors, and revamping the coursework to eliminate outdated and unnecessary material. Administrator Whitaker and some lawmakers have suggested adding a second facility.
Adding to the complexities of training new controllers is a failure rate of 30 percent at the academy. The safety team found that this contributes to the lower-than-ideal throughput and recommends, “The FAA should examine both how it selects candidates and the training they receive and make changes to help reduce the washout rate.”
Certain efforts, such as the Air Traffic Collegiate Training Initiative program, seem to hold some promise for increasing the number of qualified controller applicants. The report suggests that CPC training timelines could be reduced by 30 percent without reducing the quality of instruction if the academy expands the use of simulators and other state-of-the-art training devices.
Facilities, Equipment, and Technology
The report also found, “The age and condition of FAA facilities and equipment are elevating system risk to unsustainable levels, even before considering losses in efficiency from outdated technology.”
As an example, surveillance radars in the U.S. have an average age greater than 30 years. There are more than 500 of these systems in operation at airports and en route locations. Aging infrastructure impacts nearly every air traffic control system in the FAA’s inventory. Many systems are nearing obsolescence since many manufacturers of the original equipment no longer exist or support those legacy systems. Technicians within the FAA are retiring and do not pass along knowledge to younger employees. According to the report, the equipment replacement backlog is valued at $5.3 billion.
The safety team also identified other examples of aging infrastructure and under-utilization of new technology as two major facilities-related issues. According to the report, the ADS-B equipage effort fell short for several reasons. As an example, “The military in particular did not equip all of its aircraft.” This prevents the FAA from decommissioning older systems, which adds to the cost with minimal user benefit.
Alarmingly, investments in overhauling FAA technology have worsened the agency’s technology, according to the safety panel. “Newer systems are layered on top of older systems, and few old systems have been decommissioned or replaced.”
In many respects, the obsolescence of critical operational facilities is even more extreme. According to the report, the FAA’s 21 air route traffic control centers (ARTCCs), which control en-route aircraft, are in buildings that are between 56 and 64 years old. If one ARTCC was replaced every other year beginning in 2025, some facilities would be over 100 years old before being replaced. Building age is not trivial; low-tech issues such as water leaks and broken HVAC systems can cause a facility to go “ATC-zero,” meaning there are no ATC services.
The FAA, in response to the SRT’s recommendations, said: “The independent safety review team completed a thorough assessment and presented its recommendations to the FAA, to enhance safety and reliability in the NAS. Accordingly, the FAA will review internal safety processes, staffing levels, as well as needs for the facilities and equipment and how the agency's air traffic budget is funded.”