Last year, reports that fake signals were jeopardizing aircraft navigation systems spiked in the area over the Black Sea. First reported by security intelligence organization OpsGroup, the reports cited false or jammed global navigation satellite system (GNSS) signals, affecting the U.S. global positioning system (GPS) civil signals, causing aircraft navigation systems to show missing or inaccurate position information.
More recently, an OpsGroup member reported experiencing GPS spoofing on January 29 after departing from Israel’s Ben Gurion International Airport (LLBG). “This lasted until the FIR boundary. ATC was notified and provided vectors [to us] instead.”
GNSS is an all-encompassing term referring to any satellite-based position, navigation, and timing (PNT) system that provides information to receivers such as portable GPS units and those installed in aircraft. The U.S. GPS is one such GNSS, and there are others such as Europe’s Galileo, Russia’s Globalnaya Navigazionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema (Glonass), China’s BeiDou, and regional systems in Japan and India. Receivers can be made to operate on multiple GNSS constellations or just one. Most aircraft GNSS receivers use only the U.S. GPS constellation, while many portable GNSS receivers and watches with GNSS capability tap into multiple constellations.
GPS jamming overwhelms relatively weak GNSS signals, and in the U.S. and many other countries, it is against the law to compromise GNSS. Spoofing is not the same as jamming and is more sophisticated, tricking the receiver into calculating a false position, which could send an aircraft off the desired course. Many modern avionics products rely on GNSS, and jamming and spoofing can cause problems beyond navigation, such as the autopilot switching off.
A pilot posted the following to the Phenom Pilots Forum (for pilots who fly Embraer Phenom 100 and 300 jets) on Dec. 3, 2022: On 12/1 I took off from OPLA [Lahore, Pakistan]. At approximately 1500 [feet] I encountered GPS jamming (or perhaps spoofing). The GPS failure caused AHRS failure and, most significantly, the HSI compass started spinning at a rapid rate and was unusable, and the autopilot…failed. The AHRS did not recover. Granted, we did not fly [less than] 200 knots and wings level for 5 minutes. We were more concerned about returning to the airport. Handheld GPS devices were also jammed in this situation. We also received an immediate TAWS warning, which needed to be silenced. I can not stress how confusing and disconcerting this scenario was. Takeoff, GPS failure, TAWS collision alert, autopilot disconnect, spinning HSI compass, all concurrently.”
Growing Spoofing Reports
GPS spoofing continues to expand and increase, according to OpsGroup, which earlier said it has received nearly 50 reports of fake signals impacting aircraft operators. The group first sounded the alarm on the spoofing incidents last September, citing a dozen reports of aircraft being targeted with fake signals as they flew over Iraq near the Iranian border. In many cases, this led to a complete loss of navigational capability.
In late October, reports flowed in from operations over the eastern Mediterranean, Egypt, and on approach to Amman, Jordan. In these cases, the aircraft showed a false position of being stationary over LLBG even though they were as far as 212 nm away from the area. More recent incidents involved flights from LLBG that are being led towards Lebanon with spoofed signals.
Other reports cited by OpsGroup include a Gulfstream G650 that experienced full nav failure on departure from LLBG on October 25. The crew reported, “ATC advised we were off course and provided vectors. Within a few minutes, our estimated position uncertain (EPU) was 99 nm, FMS, IRS, and GPS position were unreliable. The navigation system thought it was 225 nm south of our present position.” Similarly, a Bombardier Global Express was spoofed on departure from LLBG, receiving a false GPS position showing as overhead Beirut. OpsGroup noted that the crew said, “The controller warned us that we are flying towards a forbidden area.” Meanwhile, a Boeing 777 in the Cairo FIR had encountered a 30-minute span of spoofing, with a false position showing the aircraft to be over LLBG.
On December 12, according to OpsGroup, a member reported spoofing near OPLA while flying a Bombardier Global 6500. By running one FMS with GPS input switched on and another with GPS off, the crew was able to observe a false GPS position showing the airplane 75 nm northeast of its actual position. ATC told the crew that they were actually on the right track.
Another member reported GPS jamming while flying on Airway A599 in the VYYF/Yangon FIR over Myanmar.
What has the experts at OpsGroup concerned is that these problems are a “real-world discovery of a fundamental flaw in avionics design. If a GPS position signal is faked, most aircraft are incapable of detecting the ruse.” Loss of navigation occurs in some cases, while in others the fake signals have led to “subtle, undetected erroneous tracking. In the worst cases, the impact has been severe—complete loss of onboard nav requiring ATC vectors, IRS [inertial reference system] failure, and unnoticed off-track navigation towards danger areas and hostile airspace. The industry has been slow to come to terms with the issue, leaving flight crews alone to find ways of detecting and mitigating GPS spoofing.”
An important tactic to minimize the risk of spoofing, according to OpsGroup, is watching for a sudden increase in the EPU on cockpit displays (if available). Spoofing causes a “jump, hence EPU values have jumped from 0.1 nm to 60 nm, and more than 99 nm in quick order.” Further, crews may receive an EFIS warning related to navigation, with some going straight to dead reckoning mode. Another clue is a significant change in the aircraft clock’s UTC time—reports have ranged from a couple of hours to as much as 12-hour changes. OpsGroup advises that if this occurs, crews should deselect GPS inputs as soon as possible to prevent wider navigation failure, switch to conventional navaids, and report the issue to ATC.
On December 26, cargo airline UPS sent a “company notam” to pilots warning about jamming and spoofing in Azerbaijan airspace and over the Black Sea, Red Sea, and eastern Mediterranean. “UPS has been in contact with Boeing on this subject and it is being actively monitored by Boeing, UPS, EASA, and the FAA.” The notam warned, “False EGPWS [enhanced ground proximity warning system] alerts may occur during or anytime after GPS spoofing due to contamination of the GPS altitude in the EGPWS. Disabling GPS updating in the FMC will not protect the EGPWS from spoofing.” UPS asked pilots to take photos of the indications and submit an event report. “Boeing will release an updated flight operations technical bulletin in the near future to address specific models,” the UPS notam noted.
A Professor’s Research
“The main fallback is an inertial sensor or the [IRS],” said Todd Humphreys, a PNT expert and professor at the University of Texas at Austin’s Cockrell School of Engineering. “When that gets captured, you realize that the design itself…appears to be flawed. In other words, the IRS is not double-checking the GPS, it's simply flywheeling through periods of GPS outage. If the GPS indicates it has a fix, then the IRS is accepting that fix without enough skepticism and updating its location and the velocity and all of its internal coefficients based on that fix.
“Most business jets have something like three or two GPS receivers and usually at least two IRSs. In other words, every one of those systems that's purportedly redundant [is] captured by the same attack, so it doesn't offer nearly the redundancy that those who designed it thought it would. When all of these are being affected by the same source and have a common mode failure, then it doesn't have the level of safety and security that that you might have expected.”
A few years ago, Humphreys went to the trouble of building a GPS spoofer while working on his Ph.D. at Cornell University. It took six months, he said, “and it was a pretty big effort for me. Fast forward to 2023, and you can buy an off-the-shelf radio and download software that is available on GitHub. And you’ve got yourself a spoofer.” However, he doesn’t believe so-called hobbyists are behind the current attacks.
In his research, Humphreys partnered with a low-earth-orbit satellite network to pinpoint locations of spoofing attacks, using ADS-B outputs and anomalies in their navigation integrity category (NIC) flags. “We also look at the time history of locations reported,” he explained. “And from that time history, you can see a completely un-physical movement of the aircraft and know that the aircraft's ADS-B unit was captured. You're looking for anomalies in the trajectory. And from all of this, you can piece together what happened.”
With this information, Humphreys was able to pinpoint the origins of spoofing attacks, one of which was the eastern periphery of Tehran in Iran. “Since that time, very similar spoofing attacks with similar effects on business jets have become pretty widespread in the area of the Israel-Gaza conflict. This might be some of Palestine's collaborators or it could just be the Israel Defense Forces trying to protect Israel [from the enemy’s GPS-guided missiles].”
“I like to say that spoofing is the new jamming, and what I mean by that is that if you have an intent to deny GPS service to your adversaries, spoofing is a more potent means of doing that than just ham-fisted jamming. That's because you don't require as much signal power to cause the receivers you're targeting to display either erroneous information or to display some flag that indicates a malfunction as compared to jamming. When jamming, you have to overwhelm the authentic signals. With spoofing, you only have to have signals that are of the same magnitude as the authentic signals. They get gobbled up into the same receiver. The receiver then gets confused and can't tell the difference and often will raise a flag and say, ‘Hey, I'm out, you can't rely on me,’ and they have then denied you service.”
Beyond mitigations that will lower the risk of spoofing attacks, which are being addressed by the industry, Humphreys believes a better option would be to simplify the process of certifying avionics, especially software-defined radios, which are much easier to upgrade quickly. “It's tough to keep ahead of the threats if you're working on [technology] latencies of 20 years. That's the nature of this business, unfortunately. But we wait until something bad happens before we do something about it.”
EASA/IATA Summit
EASA and the International Air Transport Association held a workshop in January to share incident information and remedies for GNSS jamming and spoofing. The workshop concluded that “interference with satellite-based services that provide information on the precise position of an aircraft can pose significant challenges to aviation safety.”
Workshop participants agreed on some measures to make PNT services provided by GNSS more resilient, including reporting events, eventually to a common database; sharing aircraft manufacturers’ guidance to operators; sharing EASA alerts about attacks with relevant stakeholders; and ensuring a backup system with the minimum operational network of traditional ground-based navigation aids.
“[We] have seen a sharp rise in attacks on [GNSS] systems, which poses a safety risk,” said EASA acting executive director Luc Tytgat. “EASA is tackling the risk specific to these new technologies. We immediately need to ensure that pilots and crews can identify the risks and know how to react and land safely. In the medium term, we will need to adapt the certification requirements of the navigation and landing systems. For the longer term, we need to ensure we are involved in the design of future satellite navigation systems. Countering this risk is a priority for the agency.”
EASA has also published Safety Information Bulletin 2022-02R2 on this topic.
Avionics Updates
Avionics manufacturers are well aware of GNSS jamming and spoofing issues and are working on mitigation efforts, both with existing equipment and future products. In fact, there are new standards that address these problems, including RTCA DO-384 and FAA TSO C220.
Northrop Grumman’s Litef division manufactures IRSs for a variety of aircraft manufacturers, and Klaus Blatter, product manager of commercial aviation, provided some background on how these systems work.
“The inertial system does not receive GPS information but calculates position solely based on the measurement of the inertial sensors (in a classical installation),” he explained. “Since this position information is not affected by GPS, it is not susceptible to spoofing or jamming. However, this pure inertial position information may not be accurate enough to maintain RNP/RNAV requirements in the long run. GPS correction is performed on the FMS. The FMS decides also if it uses the corrected or the uncorrected position information of the IRS.”
Modern IRSs calculate a blended or hybrid GPS/IRS solution, he added, which is provided to the FMS. “In case of GPS loss (i.e. jamming), the hybrid solution automatically continues providing position information based on the inertial measurements. The status of the hybrid solution (e.g. no GPS augmentation) is also provided to the FMS. The time how long a certain RNP/RNAV operation can be maintained after GPS loss depends on the specification of the inertial system. Usually, inertial systems providing a hybrid solution are also providing a pure inertial solution in parallel.”
How the aircraft manufacturer integrates the avionics determines whether pilots can switch off the GPS input if it is compromised. “On Litef’s inertial systems with hybrid solution, the GPS input can be switched off by commands,” he said. “But it is [up to] the system integrator if the command is implemented in the avionics.”
Pilots should be alerted to GNSS jamming, with an alert that GPS augmentation is lost, Blatter explained. “Spoofing is different: An inertial system with hybrid solution can perform plausibility checks of the received GPS data. These tests may detect inconsistent GPS signals and discard them. However, this depends on the kind and quality of spoofing. Even if suspicious data are initially detected, the spoofed GPS data may be regarded as valid again after they look consistent again. This means that the level of spoofing protection is dependent on how smart the plausibility checks can be done.”
The new RTCA DO-384 performance standard for IRSs will help with jamming and spoofing, he said.
Honeywell
Honeywell plans to certify an RTCA DO-384-compliant system this year for a commercial airliner and next year for its Laseref VI micro-inertial reference unit (IRU). Honeywell has also published a service information letter “describing the indications of spoofing and the expected avionics behaviors.” For more specific aircraft- and avionics-related procedures, Honeywell recommends consulting with the aircraft manufacturer. However, Matt Picchetti, the company’s v-p and general manager of navigation and sensors, offered additional information about Honeywell’s IRUs.
“Current Honeywell ADIRUs and micro-IRU products output two different types of navigation parameters: a pure inertial set of navigation parameters and an inertial/GPS hybrid set of navigation parameters. The pure inertial set of navigation outputs are not aided with GPS measurements and therefore are unaffected by loss of GPS or GPS spoofing during flight. In addition to pure inertial parameters, modern IRSs also output tightly integrated inertial/GPS hybrid navigation parameters.
“Current Honeywell ADIRU and micro-IRU products readily have some level of resilience to GPS spoofing for their inertial/GPS hybrid outputs. Honeywell has performed baseline testing of its inertial/GPS hybrid software against relevant industry standards. Results of that testing indicate that Honeywell's state-of-the-art products can maintain integrity of the hybrid horizontal position output by rejecting a spoofed GPS position shift of 60 nm over a 60-minute exposure time. However, in cases where spoofing-induced position steps persist for longer than can currently be detected and mitigated, IRS hybrid outputs will start utilizing spoofed GPS measurements.”
The newly updated IRUs, he said, “will further improve the resilience of the hybrid parameters to GPS spoofing with very low position shifts and extended durations. Honeywell’s new patented algorithms can reject spoofed GPS position shifts of 3 nm for over 60 minutes, which constitutes a breakthrough improvement compared to today’s IRS behavior. The IRS will also be able to indicate to flight crews and aircraft systems when GPS spoofing occurs.
“Honeywell’s upcoming product updates in the 2024/2025 timeframe will allow [detection of] spoofing, alert crews, and keep providing a high integrity GNSS/IRS hybrid position solution bounded by horizontal protection limits throughout the duration of the spoofing event. Once these product updates are available, Honeywell, therefore, recommends that downstream systems such as the FMS or surveillance systems should use the hybrid GNSS/IRS from the IRS as their primary source of position, as it will be immune to GPS spoofing, while also being more accurate than pure inertial position. Attention must also be paid to the effects on aircraft guidance during GPS-based approaches. Here again, the IRS will annunciate spoofing events to flight crews and aircraft systems such that GPS-dependent capabilities can be automatically or manually disabled.”
Universal Avionics
Universal FMSs with the latest software can’t get compromised by GNSS jamming or spoofing because of the way the FMS uses position information from DME stations. This has long been a feature of Universal FMSs, explained Jason Mason, senior engineer, avionics systems integration. In the 1980s, Universal engineers designed the FMS with navigation sensors that are run through Kalman filters to provide the best-computed position. After the U.S. Air Force switched off the GPS system’s selective availability in 2000 and GPS thus became more accurate for civil users, Universal weighted the Kalman filtering to GPS but demonstrated that DME scanning or triangulating based on DME position worked reliably when GPS signals were compromised. In 1991, Universal received FAA technical standard order approval for the DME scanning capability.
More recently, in response to customer concerns about jamming and spoofing, Universal issued a service letter to explain this to users and it also made it clear to pilots what the FMS is doing. This was incorporated in the FMS 1002.6 software and later versions. A banner message, for example, highlights that GNSS is not working and that DME-DME is being used, with the actual navigation position also displayed and recorded for post-flight perusal in Universal’s FlightReview app. This has also been added to FMS training software so pilots can see how the DME scanning protects against jamming and spoofing.
“Flight testing determined how well we can navigate with DME-DME,” said Mason. “When we realized we could do that, we decided to make it more apparent to the crew.”
The 1002.6 software is available in Universal W-series FMSs (since 2006), but there is an STC available to upgrade from older units to the W-series as a drop-in replacement.
Collins Aerospace
Collins Aerospace makes a popular GNSS receiver, the GLU 2100. Upgrades to the GLU 2100 will include making it field-upgradeable for easier modifications as requirements change. The company is also working on designing GNSS receivers that can identify abnormal signals and compensate for them or notify the crew that the navigation source is invalid, according to Adam Evanschwartz, who leads Collins Aerospace's avionics business unit product strategy. Additionally, a simple mitigation for GNSS jamming is to build receivers that can use multiple GNSS networks in case one is compromised.
Thales
Thales is aware of the threat of GNSS interference and has implemented a dedicated algorithm to detect the occurrence of spoofing. “If spoofing is detected, depending on the aircraft navigation system on board, aircraft guidance can automatically switch to sources that do not use GPS for safe continued operations,” the company told AIN. “Along with the OEMs and global aviation industry, Thales is actively engaged in the initiatives to further reinforce operations protection from spoofing, by adapting technologies and algorithms already field-proven on military platforms.”
Safran
Safran is already manufacturing SkyNaute, an inertial navigation system (INS) that meets the new RTCA DO-384 standards using its compact hemispherical resonator gyro crystal technology. “Combining high performance and integrity in all circumstances, SkyNaute shows exceptional physical features compared to competing INS with similar performance,” according to Alexandre Lenoble, senior v-p of navigation and timing product lines at Safran Electronics & Defense.
“There are two ways Safran INSs are able to detect and mitigate interferences: inertial sensors are by essence completely immune to GNSS jamming or spoofing. As a consequence, they can be used...to monitor the correctness of the GNSS signals and the hybrid navigation solution. Another way to do it is to compute interference detection and mitigation algorithms directly on the signals provided by the GNSS receiver, before blending those signals with the inertial part. This allows the INS, once it detects the spoofing event, to switch to a pure inertial/coasting navigation mode.
“As a PNT manufacturer, Safran is used to merging data from inertial sensors and GNSS in order to compute an optimal hybrid navigation solution.”
Advanced Navigation
Advanced Navigation is taking a different approach to making inertial navigation systems that can mitigate the risks of spoofing. “It is no longer a possibility, but rather, a certainty that critical industries, such as the aviation industry, will be disrupted by the proliferation of GNSS spoofing,” the company said in advance of the EASA/IATA summit. “Fortunately, leveraging the latest technology to combat the latest threat is an option. Therefore, it is paramount that the private sector remains on the front foot to minimize impact by assessing and rapidly deploying systems that can keep up with this growing concern.”
The company has developed an INS with what it says is “a new approach to filtering based on a proprietary artificial neural network processing.” The result is “extremely precise navigation capabilities in GNSS-denied scenarios as well as best-in-class integrity monitoring to detect and mitigate false or erroneous GNSS.”
In general, according to Advanced Navigation, PNT-dependent industries should utilize multi-GNSS network receivers and advanced receiver autonomous integrity monitoring and incorporate newer INS with advanced integrity monitoring such as artificial neural network-based INS. They should also work with regulators to help speed up the integration of new technology. “Expediting certification processes, without compromising safety standards, can ensure aviation equipment remains at the forefront of defense against the ever-evolving threat landscape,” the company said.
Dassault Aviation
GNSS jamming and spoofing has become a “hot topic,” according to Dassault pilot support engineer Mathias Paquier.
The way Dassault has set up the Honeywell avionics in its EASy-equipped business jets is not to use the hybrid feature that uses GPS to update the IRS position.“This is not exactly the same on Falcon compared to competitors,” Paquier said. “This means in practice that on Falcons when using the IRS inputs, this input cannot be impacted by GPS spoofing. As we do not use [the hybrid inputs], the FMS cannot be impacted.”
The Falcons’ FMS picks the sensor with the best Estimated Position Uncertainty (EPU), starting with GPS. If that is compromised, the FMS then looks at the IRS position, then uses DME-DME or VOR-DME.
Of course, the latter require that the airplane be within range of usable DME-DME or VOR-DME ground stations. But in the worst case and if the IRS would also fail, the FMS can continue navigation based on dead reckoning.
Falcon pilots should know the symptoms of GPS jamming, which include loss of synthetic vision. “This is probably the easiest one to spot,” he said. “It’s right in front of the pilots.” The next symptom would be a CAS message for ADS-B Out fail, because ADS-B Out relies on GPS.
Secondary symptoms include a message such as “Unable RNP,” which indicates that the EPU is too large for the required navigation performance (RNP) in the area where the airplane is flying. The EPU isn’t displayed on the PFD permanently but can be viewed on the “show sensors” page. The enhanced mode of the EGPWS will also not be available.
Finally, passengers will likely notice that the satcom no longer works. “This is a big inconvenience for passengers,” he noted. After the jamming ends, the aircraft will reconfigure and return to normal.
“When we talk about spoofing then things become more difficult,” Paquier said.
When a customer experienced spoofing over Hatay Province in Turkey, the navigation system showed the airplane 70 nm away from its actual position. The UTC time on the pilot’s display was incorrect, which is a good spoofing indication, and the FMS popped up a message to “check IRS position.”
With no CAS message or obvious failure message, he explained, “It can be really difficult for the pilots to realize what’s happening.”
Dassault has issued a bulletin to operators as early as April 2022 and advises when flying in areas at risk of spoofing to deselect GPS 1 and 2 on the nav sensors page. This deselects the GPS input from the FMS so the FMS isn’t using the GPS for navigation updates. “Even if you’re spoofed, this has no impact on the FMS,” he said. “After leaving the area, you can reselect the GPS input.”
In case pilots did not anticipate GPS deselection before being spoofing happens, they should still deselect the GPS input, he said. “If your FMS position has been corrupted and then you deselect, it will revert to the IRS mode. It will keep your last valid position (in this case the spoofed one) and will be updated using IRS input from there. The recommendation is therefore to perform an update of the FMS position using raw IRS position. The raw IRS cannot be impacted by spoofing because it’s not impacted by GPS. The downside is that raw IRS position is impacted by IRS drift, but at least you will come back to a reasonable position, which is then automatically updated using DME-DME or VOR-DME if within range. If you’re taking off from a spoofing area, you can always deselect GPS and update the FMS after engine start using a reference point or lat/long position [on the ground].”
Paquier also advises pilots to know which IRS is the most accurate, then choose that one as the primary. “You can check the real drift of each IRS on the avionics page. If you know IRS 2 is always less, our recommendation is that you might keep that one in mind when updating the FMS position.”
Some operators (not just in Falcons) have reported that the GPS doesn’t recover after a spoofing incident. Pilots should be prepared to navigate using non-GPS sources. “This poses an operational challenge,” he said, “if they have to fly long-range with no GPS. It requires more preparation. We used to fly like this 20 years ago, but we’re not comfortable flying today without GPS.”
While many countries are decommissioning ground-based navaids, many experts are recommending that countries maintain a robust network of ground-based navaids such as VOR and DME stations.
There is one other unofficial technique that pilots might consider, and that is pairing a portable multi-network GPS receiver to their tablet computers. Some receivers can use GPS, Galileo, and Glonass, and spoofing may only affect one of them. Obviously, regulators don’t permit pilots to use EFB moving maps as official navigation sources, but the EFB could provide an easy way to confirm a spoofing encounter and also give some location advice to supplement other sources. Using multiple constellations is actually one of the possible medium-term improvements for aircraft GPS receivers. This isn’t a silver bullet, he pointed out, because jammers will likely jam all GNSS signals.
Paquier, who attended the EASA/IATA summit, concluded that immediate solutions are not readily available. “Everybody is working hard on short-, medium-, and long-term mitigations. EASA is taking this really seriously. It’s important to keep in mind that we’re discovering every day each combination of avionics, sensors, and aircraft is producing slightly different symptoms. And these can vary from one type to another, even within Dassault [platforms]. The information you will have from different OEMs might be different. The story is still unfolding.”
Gulfstream
Gulfstream Aerospace has issued a maintenance operations letter to operators of its aircraft, first advising pilots to plan flights around known areas where jamming or spoofing is occurring. “If it is necessary to fly through such areas, consider utilizing ground-based navigation sources.”
Pilots should report any anomalies to ATC, the company advised. “When applicable, flight crews should request vectors and/or utilize ground-based navigation. Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) procedures should be followed for any Crew Alerting System (CAS) messages and indications of degraded navigation. Procedures should be followed for any CAS messages and indications of degraded navigation.”
Having assisted in producing the December Honeywell service information letter, Gulfstream is also working with Collins Aerospace to provide similar information to operators flying its airplanes equipped with Collins avionics.
Bombardier
According to Bombardier, the company “has been very proactive with its customers about the realities of GPS spoofing.
“In late December 2023, Bombardier released an Advisory Wire to enhance the communication to all our customers, adding to the FONs (Flight Operation Notifications) we published earlier that year. In addition, we have published several updates in our customer communications last year to inform customers of the issue. We have also worked closely with the(FAA and various fleet operators to ensure they have the most up-to-date information.”
Satcom Direct
Instead of adding new equipment, Satcom Direct offers geolocation technology for customers using its FlightDeck Freedom GeoServices. “Few situations are more alarming for flight crew than realizing they are suddenly unable to accurately determine the aircraft position,” the company said. “When aircraft positioning can no longer be correctly determined, separation in the sky becomes more difficult to ensure and the risk of political complications greatly increases.”
GeoServices provides GeoNotification alerts when a customer’s aircraft is nearing a region where spoofing attacks have occurred, based on GeoFence settings in FlightDeck Freedom. “[This] provides users with an advanced warning of the danger, allowing them to alter course and avoid the potential disruption to their navigation systems.”
AIN is aware of other efforts that will address GNSS jamming and spoofing and will report about these as they are unveiled. One will be announced at the AEA avionics show March 19 and another is a GPS anomaly detection app that has been released by flight planning app developer APG. Meanwhile, OpsGroup recommends that pilots view areas affected by GPS interference at the gpsjam.org website and “don’t fly into any red or yellow hexagons!”