We’ve now had two situations where locked cockpit doors have either resulted in an accident or nearly allowed an accident to happen. And new requirements will see even more complex, secondary doors that could feature in future screw-ups. The only way to fix this is to put the bathroom inside the flight deck and cut slots in the doors so flight attendants can shovel food in for the pilots.
Wait a minute—now we’re talking about a flying jail cell.
This issue is coming to the fore not just because of the Germanwings accident on March 24, 2015, where the first officer locked the captain out of the flight deck and then crashed the airplane, killing all 150 on board. Nor is it because of the Feb. 17, 2024, Lufthansa Airbus A321 incident where the pilot left the flight deck to go to the bathroom and the first officer lost consciousness for 10 minutes.
In that incident, the captain was unable to open the door, because of various complicated design features that are intended to keep ill-intended people from breaching the flight deck. The door didn’t open until the first officer regained consciousness and released a switch to allow the captain access.
This issue is top of mind now because the Air Line Pilots Association is upset that the airlines’ trade association, Airlines for America (A4A), petitioned the FAA to impose a two-year delay on implementation of the new regulations required by Section 336 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018. That legislation mandated installation of secondary flight deck barriers on U.S. airliners.
In the reauthorization, the Saracini Aviation Safety Act, named after one of the pilots in a hijacked airplane that terrorists crashed into the South Tower of the World Trade Center on 9/11, called for the FAA to empanel a rulemaking committee, then issue a final rule mandating installation of secondary barriers on new and existing airliners.
ALPA president Jason Ambrosi issued this statement about the FAA’s delay: “ALPA has long advocated for installed secondary flight deck barriers and was proud to lead the charge to enact legislation implementing this critical security enhancement. The airlines have had two years to implement these requirements, yet they are now requesting an extension for the same time granted to them by the final rule. We urge the FAA to reject this latest stalling tactic and implement, without delay, the secondary barrier requirement as Congress mandated.”
According to the petition, “Airlines for America requests relief for its members to operate aircraft worldwide without flight crew deploying an installed physical secondary barrier (IPSB) in accordance with [FAR] 121.313(l), 121.401(a), and 121.584(a)(3), until operators have completed the required training of all subject personnel. During this exemption, existing procedures will be used by flight crews, maintaining an equivalent level of safety and security.”
In light of the Germanwings accident and the Lufthansa incident, this delay seems to make sense. I have no idea how these doors and secondary barriers work; it’s likely top secret, need-to-know stuff. Extensive training and scenario practice will be required.
But it’s clear that during the Lufthansa flight, the complexity of even just a single flight deck door mechanism was sufficient to baffle the wide-awake captain, who had to wait for the copilot to regain enough consciousness to enable the door to be opened. What scenarios are likely when we have two complex mechanisms that will be subject to human frailties?
As I see it, there are only two solutions to this problem. One is automated airplanes. Without pilots, there will be no need for a flight deck door or doors because there won’t be a flight deck.
Absent full automation, we will have to lock the pilots into their flying jail cell and send in food and drink at suitable intervals and hope that their single, non-redundant toilet doesn’t get clogged up.
Adding complexity to a complex system is not good engineering and often introduces unintended consequences. Of course, I understand the desire to make it impossible for terrorists to breach the flight deck. Can we rely on the fact that the pilots are not supposed to open the door(s), no matter what is taking place on the other side of the door(s)? That is a difficult question to answer, and in the act that mandated secondary doors, Congress tried to assess the cost-benefit of another terrorist attack aboard an airliner versus trying to deter such an attack.
“In considering the potential costs of a major terrorist event, as demonstrated by the 9/11 attacks, and the potential benefits of disrupting or deterring such an occurrence, it is difficult to gauge the probability of a large-scale attack or to independently assess the degree to which a single measure, such as a secondary cockpit barrier, might disrupt such an attack amid a complex and multilayered approach to aviation security,” the bill says.
“Nonetheless, FAA concluded that, if secondary cockpit barriers are completely effective at thwarting attacks, installing them would be cost-effective, assuming the probability of an attempted terrorist attack is at least 0.66% per year, or approximately one attempt of that scale every 150 years.”