PRELIMINARY REPORTS
Bleed Air Leak Leads to Diversion Over Qatar
Bombardier Learjet 60XR, near Doha, Qatar, March 9, 2016–While cruising at FL190 on a flight from King Khalid International Airport (OERK) in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, to Qatar’s Doha International Airport (OTBD), the flight attendant reported a bad odor, heat and white smoke in the cabin shortly after the flight crew engaged the aircraft’s thermal wing anti-icing system.
The crew subsequently diverted to Hamad International Airport (OTHH) in Doha and made an uneventful landing. None of the seven people aboard was injured. According to the Qatar Civil Aviation Authority, investigators found a damaged coupling on the right wing anti-icing duct, located behind the right aft sidewall adjacent to the bulkhead, which resulted in a bleed-air leak.
Turbulence on Approach Damages Cargo Turboprop
Beechcraft Model 99A, Rockland, Maine, March 2, 2016–An encounter with severe turbulence while on approach at Knox County Regional Airport (RKD) in Rockland resulted in significant airframe damage to a Beech 99 freighter, but no injuries to the commercial pilot.
The Part 135 nonscheduled cargo flight originated from Manchester Airport (MHT) in Manchester, N.H., and was operating under an IFR flight plan. The pilot told investigators she was in IMC and flying through continuous light to moderate turbulence while descending for the ILS approach to RKD. She encountered severe turbulence while descending through 2,000 feet msl at 130 knots, at which time she broke off the approach and diverted to Bangor International Airport (BGR). The pilot noted that she continued to experience light to moderate turbulence en route to BGR.
An FAA inspector noted the upper surfaces of both wings had skin deformation, and the fuselage side skins were wrinkled. A more extensive examination by a local repair station found substantial damage to the upper wing skin and the right wing root between the fuselage and nacelle just aft of the main spar. The right wing root to fuselage fillet was also damaged just aft of the main spar, with “several other” areas of wrinkled skin on both wings.
FACTUAL
Pilot: Foam Elevator Block Led to Kodiak Accident
Quest Kodiak 100, near Sheridan, Wyo., Oct. 9, 2015–In an email to investigators, the pilot of a Quest Kodiak that crashed on takeoff last October (Accidents: December 2015) said he believes the accident was caused by his own failure to remove a foam block intended to raise the elevator above the heads of people walking around the parked aircraft.
According to the updated factual report, the pilot wrote to investigators that a second pilot of the aircraft had placed the block in the elevator mechanism before his flight. “If he had told me about it, I had certainly forgotten it. It would have been red with a removable streamer,” the pilot wrote, adding that he believes the obstruction “was the primary factor for the accident and that the block should have been discovered by me during the preflight or the pre-takeoff check.”
The accident pilot noted no discrepancies during a preflight check of the flight controls, and investigators said no one among the recovery crew, the airport manager or the insurance adjuster contacted after the crash could recall seeing the foam piece described. Investigators also noted that the aircraft’s flaps were fully deployed at the time of the accident, and the engine condition lever was in the feathered position. The firmware on the airplane’s primary and multifunction displays did not allow for the recording of flight data.
NTSB: Meridian Crashed Shortly After Instructed To Break Off Approach
Piper PA-46-500TP, near Lubbock, Texas, Feb. 4, 2015–A Piper Meridian crashed shortly after ATC advised the pilot to break off the Rnav (GPS) Y approach to Runway 35L at Lubbock Preston Smith International Airport (LBB) in night IMC. The flight had departed from Carlsbad, N.M. one hour before the reported accident time of 7:30 p.m., with the pilot activating an IFR flight plan shortly after departure.
Recorded ATC transmissions indicated the pilot told controllers he was having difficulty configuring the aircraft’s instruments for the Rnav approach. The pilot requested to circle and work through the avionics issue, and the controller instructed him to maintain at or above 8,000 feet and continue on his present heading. The pilot was subsequently cleared to turn right to 160 and descend and maintain 7,000 feet, followed by heading and altitude clearances for the aircraft to intercept the zovoc waypoint, 11 nm south of the airport, and re-establish the approach to the runway.
After the aircraft passed zovoc, the approach controller advised the pilot to break off the approach, climb to 7,000 feet, and fly a heading of 275 degrees for re-sequencing to avoid conflict with another aircraft. The pilot acknowledged and then confirmed the turn, which was the last recorded transmission received from the aircraft. Radar data indicated the aircraft began a left climbing turn from 5,600 feet to 5,800 feet and continued turning left through the assigned heading, followed by a rapid descent.
Investigators determined the aircraft struck a television tower guy wire seven miles south of the airport. A witness who observed the accident from a parking lot next to the tower told investigators he heard the accident aircraft overhead and that he believed its engine was operating. The witness then saw a large flash of light, followed by the tower collapsing on itself. Surveillance videos from two locations indicated the aircraft was in a steep descent as it passed behind the tower, followed by multiple large flashes of light.
Reported weather conditions at LBB a half-hour before the accident indicated wind from 30 degrees at 21 knots, gusting to 31 knots, with eight miles visibility and an overcast at 800 feet agl, temperature 28 degrees F, dew point 25 degrees F. A special weather observation at 7:47 p.m., 20 minutes after the crash, reported wind from 40 degrees at 18 knots gusting to 27 knots, seven miles visibility and an overcast at 700 feet agl, and an identical temperature/dew point spread. The witness to the accident described conditions as cold, very low clouds, and no precipitation at the accident location. The sole-occupant pilot perished in the crash.
As of Dec. 31, 2013, the pilot had accumulated 1,073 total hours, 117 of which were at night, with 50 hours in actual IFR conditions and 44 hours in simulated IFR. The accident airplane had its original avionics replaced with glass-panel systems in December 2011. Investigators could not determine the pilot’s experience in the Meridian because logbook entries were incomplete.
FINAL
NTSB: Citation Pilot Had Expired Medical Certificate, Not Approved to Fly at Night
Cessna 525, in Elk City, Okla., Feb. 3, 2014–While on an instrument approach to Runway 17 at Elk City Regional Business Airport (ELK) in night IMC, the light jet struck a 29-foot-tall electric utility pole at 10 feet, 7 inches agl, at a GPS-estimated elevation of 2,070 feet msl. The pilot executed a missed approach. The aircraft later made an uneventful landing at Will Rogers World Airport (OKC) in Oklahoma City, with no injuries to the pilot and six passengers on board the Part 91 flight from Rapid City Regional Airport (RAP) in South Dakota. The Safety Board identified the pilot’s descent below MDA as the sole probable cause of the accident.
Radar data showed that the Citation descended below the minimum descent altitude of 2,480 feet msl shortly after crossing the final approach fix. Immediately before the collision, the aircraft’s transponder reported an altitude of 2,100 feet msl; shortly after impact, with the aircraft half a mile south of the accident location, the transponder reported altitude as 2,200 feet msl before it continued to climb to 12,000 feet msl while diverting to OKC.
The pilot told investigators that he thought he had leveled off at an indicated altitude of 2,500 feet msl, and at no time during the descent and approach did the airplane’s radar altimeter sound the alert that he was below 400 feet radar altitude. He added that he never saw the terrain, any obstructions or the runway lights or airport environment during the approach to ELK.
Post-flight examination of the aircraft revealed substantial damage to the nose, lower and upper fuselage surface, and the left horizontal stabilizer. The right side of the radome showed impact damage, with a penetrating impact in the right side of the forward avionics bay. Both engines showed signs of ingesting foreign objects, but there was not a resulting significant loss of engine power. A separated and impact-damaged navigation receiver from the airplane was recovered from near the accident area, along with several paint chips.
Conditions at ELK, two miles south of the accident site at 2,013 feet msl, five minutes after the accident were reported as wind from 110 degrees at 5 knots, visibility 2.5 miles in mist, and overcast at 500 feet agl.
The NTSB found that the ATP-rated pilot’s second-class medical certificate–issued on May 19, 2012–was expired at the time of the accident. It contained these limitations: “not valid for night flying or by color signal control,” and “must have available glasses for near vision.” However, investigators noted, "[t]here is no evidence that these restrictions contributed to the accident.”
Gusty Wind Felled AStar
Airbus Helicopters AS350B, near Mayhill, N.M., June 27, 2014–The pilot’s failure to maintain control while attempting a go-around at a private heliport in strong, gusting wind led to the downing of an AStar in southeastern New Mexico, according to the NTSB. The pilot and one passenger were not injured, another passenger received minor injuries and a third passenger was seriously injured.
The Part 91 flight originated from Artesia Municipal Airport (ATS) in Artesia at 4:45 p.m. While approaching to land at P J Arabian Ranch in Mayhill at 5:20 p.m., the pilot noticed “very gusty” wind, with a windsock varying from an indicated headwind to a 90-degree crosswind. The pilot told investigators he initiated a go-around and climbed 300 to 500 feet while increasing the airspeed by 50 to 55 knots. After entering a right turn, the pilot reported the helicopter encountered either a strong gust, or “ground twister,” which forced the helicopter’s nose down 15 to 20 degrees. The pilot leveled the nose of the helicopter but was unable to arrest the descent rate. The helicopter struck the terrain, bounced 10 to 15 feet in the air and struck the ground a second time, causing substantial damage.
Five minutes before the accident, the ATS Automated Weather Observing System (AWOS), located 53 miles east of the accident site, indicated wind from 260 degrees at 19 knots gusting to 29 knots. At the same time, wind at Alamogordo-White Sands Regional Airport (ALM), 37 miles west of the accident site, was from 260 degrees at 19 knots gusting to 29 knots. The pilot reported that he checked the ALM AWOS before he departed on the flight and that, at that time, it indicated wind 240 degrees at 17 knots gusting to 21 knots.
PC-12 Collides with Deer on Departure
Pilatus PC-12, Lawrenceville, Ga., Jan. 26, 2016–While departing in night VMC from Gwinnett County Airport-Briscoe Field (LZU), the pilot of the single-engine turboprop maneuvered to avoid two white-tailed deer on the runway, but one of the deer hit the nosewheel. The pilot continued the takeoff and then orbited the airport for 1.5 hours before making an uneventful landing. Post-flight inspection showed substantial damage to the fuselage.
The airport manager told investigators that all movement areas at the airport are fenced with “standard FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) specification 6-foot-tall chain link fence with triple strand barbed wire at the top on standard 45-degree angle outriggers.”
According to the aircraft operator, a conversation with the airport manager indicated that the deer population in the vicinity of the airport had grown in response to hunting pressure elsewhere in the area. The NTSB noted that a December 2004 CertAlert from the FAA recommended a minimum eight-foot chain link fence with three-strand barbed wire outriggers around airports with wildlife activity and 10- to 12-foot chain link perimeter fencing, with three-strand barbed wire outriggers around airports with a significant wildlife presence.
The aircraft operator also emphasized to investigators the importance of accurate reporting by airport users and airport management about wildlife activity, so that a program of regular wildlife population control may be proactively implemented. Without such reporting, the operator stated, airport managers cannot properly gauge their response.