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Airport Staff, ATC, Pilots Implicated in Fatal Falcon Crash
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The jet lifted off the runway at about 134 knots, but a moment later the right wing and right landing gear hit the snowplow before the airplane crashed.
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The jet lifted off the runway at about 134 knots, but a moment later the right wing and right landing gear hit the snowplow before the airplane crashed.
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The fatal crash of a French-registered Dassault Falcon 50EX that hit a snowplow during takeoff from Moscow Vnukovo International Airport on Oct. 20, 2014, was caused by a combination of factors that implicate several airport workers, air traffic controllers and the trijet’s pilots, according to a final report from Russia’s Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC). Criminal charges have been levied against seven controllers and airport workers, including the snowplow driver, who was believed to have been intoxicated at the time of the collision.


The accident occurred shortly before midnight in drizzle and mist. Two snowplows were working under the command of a supervisor, who was present in a car in the area but lost sight of one of the snowplows at the same time the Falcon 50 was cleared for takeoff.


About 10 seconds after the crew received permission to take off, the surface movement radar in the control tower showed one of the snowplows moving toward the active runway, and some 14 seconds after the aircraft began its takeoff roll the crew observed a “car" crossing the runway, according to the cockpit voice recorder.


The crew continued the takeoff, and the jet lifted off the runway at about 134 knots. But a moment later, the right wing and right landing gear hit the snowplow. The airplane rolled inverted, crashed and burst into flames. The three crewmemberswere killed, along with Christophe de Margerie, CEO of oil company Total.


While the report blamed airport workers and controllers for numerous violations of procedure, failure of supervisory responsibilities, a breakdown of communications, lack of proper equipment on the snowplows and loss of situational awareness, it also implicated the flight crew. Among the criticisms: lack of recommendations in the operator's (Unijet) flight operating manual for pilot actions when external threats appear on the runway during takeoff; the crew’s failure to take measures to reject the takeoff as soon as the captain mentioned the vehicle; and the design of the Falcon 50EX in which nosewheel steering can be controlled only from the left seat, “resulting in the necessity to transfer aircraft control at a high-workload phase of the takeoff roll when the first officer in the right seat was performing the takeoff.”


Investigators added that the crew’s decisions might have been influenced by a “long wait for the departure at an unfamiliar airport and their desire to fly home as soon as possible, which might have made it difficult for them to assess the actual threat level as they noticed the snowplow after they had started the takeoff run.”

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