A crew’s decision to land with a tailwind above the aircraft’s operating limitations and perform an unstabilized approach lead to the Jan. 5, 2014 crash of a Bombardier Challenger 601-3R at Aspen-Pitkin Airport in Colorado, the NTSB concluded. In its final report released on April 20, NTSB cited the crew’s failure to maintain airplane control as the probable cause of the accident. The decision to perform the approach rather than go-around and the decision to land in winds gusting up to 25 knots were cited as contributing factors.
The aircraft, N115WF, was operated by Vineland Corp. of Panama on a Part 91 flight from Tucson, Arizona, to Aspen-Pitkin Airport when it crashed on Runway 15, killing the copilot, and injuring the captain and a passenger who also was a pilot rated on the aircraft.
The aircraft was on approach to Runway 15 when air traffic control advised that wind was from 290 degrees at 19 knots with gusts to 25 knots. One minute later the crew reported they were executing a missed approach and requested vectors for a second approach. ATC provided vectors for another LOC/DME-E approach to Runway 15, but also advised that the wind was from 330 degress at 16 knots and the one-minute average wind was from 320 degrees at 14 knots gusting to 25 knots.
The initial part of the second approach went as expected for descent angle, flap setting and spoilers, the NTSB reported. But in the final minute of flight, “the engines were advanced and retarded five times, and the airplane's airspeed varied between 135 knots and 150 knots,” according to the report, which added the final part of the approach was inconsistent with a stabilized approach. The report continues, "The airplane stayed nose down during its final descent and initial contact with the runway. The vertical acceleration and pitch parameters were consistent with the airplane pitch oscillating above the runway for a number of seconds before a hard runway contact, a gain in altitude, and a final impact into the runway at about 6 g."
“Assuming the crew had control of the airplane, and that the engines were advanced to the appropriate climb setting, anti-ice was off, and tailwinds were less than a sustained 25 knots, the airplane had the capability to complete a go-around, clearing the local obstacles along that path,” NTSB said.
The airplane flight manual specifies "the maximum tailwind component approved for takeoff and landing is 10 knots."
Both crewmembers had recently completed simulator training in the CL600. The captain, who held a Mexican air transport pilot certificate, had between 12 and 14 hours total time in type, including simulator hours. A further review determined that the certificate should also have included a pilot-in-command limitation for the CL600, but the designated pilot examiner had overlooked that fact. The copilot, who also held a temporary U.S. FAA airman certificate with a pilot-in-command limitation for the CL600, had approximately the same hours in type.
“Additional flight time would have increased the crew's familiarity with the airplane and its limitation and likely improved their decision-making during the unstabilized approach,” the NTSB said. The captain had asked the passenger, who had experience in the type, to accompany them to provide guidance. The passenger was in the jumpseat position, unable to reach the controls or act as a qualified pilot-in-command, the Safety Board added.