Preliminary Reports
Violent Weather in Vicinity of King Air Crash Beech 200, Feb. 22, 2023, Little Rock, Arkansas
The pilot of the King Air that crashed just after takeoff, killing all five on board, had received warnings of low-level wind shear from both airport ATIS and ground control. Archived radar imagery also showed that the takeoff attempt was made just ahead of an advancing squall line that concentrated intense thunderstorm activity into a long, narrow storm front. During the nine minutes surrounding clearance to take off from Runway 18, winds at the airport shifted from 210 degrees at 19 knots with gusts to 27 to 300 degrees at 22 gusting to 40.
An airport surveillance camera recorded the takeoff and initial climb, followed by a plume of smoke just after the airplane passed out of sight. The runway was dry. Moments later the camera began to shake and captured images of blowing debris and heavy rain on the ramp. Examination of the wreckage found evidence that both engines were producing power at impact, with no suggestion of any prior abnormality.
Passenger Death Not Caused by Turbulence, Bombardier BD-100-1A10 Challenger 300, March 4, 2023, Windsor Locks, Connecticut
Contrary to initial reports, the in-flight upset that fatally injured one of three passengers was not caused by turbulence. Rather, an apparent flight--control anomaly caused a series of violent pitch oscillations as the two-pilot crew attempted to follow quick reference handbook (QRH) procedures to resolve multiple caution messages on the Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System (EICAS). The Part 91 flight was en route from Keene, New Hampshire, to Leesburg, Virginia.
The aircraft took off after the EICAS advised of a rudder limit fault, a message that is normally a no-go item on the Challenger 300 if the aircraft hasn’t taken off.
While climbing on autopilot through 6,000 feet, the EICAS displayed warnings for autopilot stabilizer trim failure, Mach trim failure, and “autopilot holding nose down.” Neither pilot could recall the precise order in which they appeared. The co-pilot located the QRH checklist for primary (instead of autopilot) stabilizer trim failure. The first item was turning the stabilizer trim switch OFF, thereby also disconnecting the autopilot. As soon he did so, the airplane abruptly pitched up.
The pilot used both hands to stabilize the airplane’s attitude after several seconds of oscillations, during which the flight data recorder (FDR) logged vertical acceleration forces of +3.8 g in an 11-degree nose-up attitude, downward acceleration of -2.3 g, and upward acceleration of +4.2 g pitched 20 degrees nose-up, activating the stick pusher. The acceleration decreased to +2.2 g before the FDR stopped recording, apparently from activation of its impact g switch.
The pilot had no further difficulty controlling the airplane using the manual trim switch, and did not reengage the autopilot. After another passenger advised them of the injury, the crew diverted to Connecticut’s Bradley International Airport, where an ambulance met them on the ramp. The injured passenger was hospitalized but died later that day; whether she’d been belted or otherwise restrained was not initially reported. The pilots and other two passengers were unharmed.
Heli-Ski Support Aircraft Damaged in Whiteout, Bell 206L-3, March 12, 2023, Valemount, British Columbia, Canada
The pilot suffered minor injuries and the ski guide escaped unhurt when their Bell LongRanger III rolled over while attempting to establish a new landing site to pick up skiers at the end of a run. After scouting the terrain, the pilot set up a south-southeast approach at low airspeed and a low descent angle in anticipation of whiteout conditions on touchdown. The helicopter touched down on its left skid first, then the right, and began to roll right. The pilot stopped lowering collective as the aircraft was engulfed in blowing snow, rolling forward and right until the main rotor blades struck the ground.
The engine stopped, the pilot shut off the electrical master and closed the fuel shutoff valve. He and the guide escaped through the broken windshield. Both had been wearing helmets and four-point restraints. The pilot used a plastic bin to catch fuel leaking from an airframe vent and contacted the lodge with a handheld radio. The primary ski helicopter picked them up five minutes later.
Final Reports
Pilot Inexperience Cited in Beach Crash, Eurocopter EC120B, Dec. 15, 2020, Kekerengu, New Zealand
New Zealand’s Transport Accident Investigation Commission (TAIC) concluded that the pilot’s limited flight experience “very likely” contributed to his loss of awareness of reduced airspeed on the downwind leg of a reconnaissance pattern, leaving the craft vulnerable to unanticipated yaw. The pilot and the only adult passenger were killed when the helicopter spun out of control and crashed onto the beach while preparing to land near a café where they’d planned to have lunch. Three children, aged five, eleven, and twelve years, survived with significant injuries.
The flight originated from the pilot’s home near Rangiora. After fueling at the Rangiora Aerodrome, he proceeded northward at 2,000 feet, reaching the coast in about an hour. He made a first left orbit offshore of the café at about 600 feet, then descended to 300 feet for a second circuit, the typical profile for a high-and-low reconnoiter of an off-airport landing site. As it descended through 200 feet in a tightening left turn, the helicopter’s groundspeed decreased to 25 knots. Witnesses saw it begin to yaw left as it approached the beach; the yaw accelerated into spinning and the aircraft crashed onto the beach near the low-tide line.
The 60-year-old private pilot had begun his flight training just 18 months earlier in a Cabri Guimbal G2. He received his private pilot’s license on March 5, 2020 with 84.5 hours of flight time, all in that helicopter. He bought the accident helicopter several months later and received his type certificate on July 31, less than five months before the accident, after 7.7 hours of transition training. At the time of the accident he had logged 169.5 hours of flight experience, 81 of them in dual instruction and 32 in the EC120B.
The TAIC noted that both the Cabri Guimbal G2 and the EC120B use the Fenestron shrouded tail rotor, which requires more forceful right pedal inputs in response to increasing power. The manufacturers’ cautions were included in training materials.
Botched Go-around Injures Four, Daher TBM 700N (TBM 910), Oct. 10, 2021, Westlock Aerodrome, Alberta, Canada
The private pilot and one passenger suffered serious injuries when the turboprop single rolled inverted and crashed during an attempted go-around following a bounced landing. The remaining two passengers escaped with minor injuries. The accident occurred on the second leg of a flight that originated at Vernon (British Columbia) Airport with the pilot and one passenger on board. The other two boarded during a brief stop at Calgary/Springbank Airport in Alberta.
The IFR flight’s filed destination was Edmonton/Villeneuve Airport, but about 30 minutes after takeoff the pilot amended it to Westlock Aerodrome after learning that weather would permit a visual approach. (Westlock had no instrument approach procedures at that time.)
Approaching from the south, the airplane crossed the airport midfield and entered a right-hand pattern for Runway 28 with gear and flaps extended. It remained above the nominal three-degree descent path on final approach, descending at 1,500 feet per minute, until about one mile from the threshold at 350 feet. As it descended toward a point short of the runway, pitch attitude but not power increased and airspeed declined to 66 knots. It then touched down on the pavement but short of the threshold and bounced. Power increased to full and the turboprop bounced a second time, rolled right, dragged a wingtip, and rolled left. Pitch attitude reached 24 degrees nose-up as the TBM struck and fracture the left wing, crashed inverted, and slid off the runway.
Only one passenger wore the available shoulder harnesses. The seriously injured passenger was only secured by a lap belt and was struck by unsecured baggage in the cabin. The pilot also did not wear his airbag-equipped shoulder harness. Both the pilot’s and co-pilot’s airbags activated during the crash and the pilot’s head hit the cabin ceiling, causing “serious life-changing injuries.” Rescuers needed two hours to extricate him from the wreckage.
Falcon Stopped by Goose, Dassault Falcon 2000, Sept. 20, 2022, Pietermaritzburg Airport, Kwazulu-Natal Province, South Africa
The pilot successfully brought the aircraft to a stop on the runway after the number two (right) engine ingested a large bird during the takeoff roll. Nine passengers were on board the corporate flight to King Shaka Inernational Airport in KwaZulu--Natal Province. No injuries were reported, but several broken compressor fan blades penetrated the upper right side of the fuselage about 15 cm (six inches) forward of the aft pressurized compartment bulkhead.
After back-taxiing on Runway 16, the jet was cleared for takeoff. Initial acceleration was normal, but as it reached 90-95 knots, a large bird believed to be a spur-winged goose lifted off from tall grass along the right side of the runway. The airplane shuddered and veered right and the pilot immediately called for a rejected takeoff, pulling both power levers back to idle and applying maximum braking. A check of the engine instruments after the airplane stopped confirmed that the number two engine’s fuel flow had dropped to zero. Passengers deplaned safely through the main cabin door once the area was confirmed as safe.
Airport procedures require four scheduled daily inspections for wildlife hazards, with additional inspections 10 minutes prior to scheduled arrivals and departures “in peak wildlife season.” The most recent had been conducted 35 minutes before the accident. They also call for appointment of a wildlife control officer, but that position was open at the time, leaving those duties to air traffic control and firefighting crews. ζ