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NTSB Reiterates Part 135 Single-engine Load Manifest Exclusion Recommendations
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After another similar accident, the NTSB again recommended that single-engine commercial ops be included in load manifest regs under FAR 135.63(c).
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After another similar accident, the NTSB again recommended that single-engine commercial ops be included in load manifest regs under FAR 135.63(c).
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In its final report on the Aug. 16, 2021, upset accident of a Cessna 208 on a passenger-carrying air-taxi flight, the NTSB reiterated its previous recommendations that the FAA include single-engine aircraft in the load manifest requirements of FAR 135.63(c) that currently apply only to multiengine aircraft. The pilot and nine passengers were uninjured during the upset.

The NTSB addressed this exclusion with safety recommendations in 1990, 2014, and 2021, asking the FAA to add single-engine aircraft to the requirements. Because the FAA did not accept the recommendations, the NTSB has closed them out as “unacceptable action.”

According to the recently published accident report, while the aircraft was descending from 10,500 ft msl to 10,000 ft msl seeking to depart icing conditions, the autopilot disengaged without warning and the turboprop single entered an “abrupt right bank followed by a steep, nose-down, spiraling descent.” After regaining control, the pilot declared an emergency and landed at the departure airport.

At the time of the accident, the aircraft was nearly 300 pounds over its maximum approved gross weight for flight-in-known-icing conditions. It sustained substantial damage to the wings and the right aileron during the upset. 

FAR 135.63(c) requires the preparation of a load manifest that includes the number of passengers, total weight of the loaded aircraft, mtow, and center of gravity location. Single-engine operations, such as the accident flight, are excluded from this requirement.

“Had the pilot been required to compute and record a weight and balance calculation, she may have been more aware of the airplane’s limitations for flight-in-known-icing conditions and its overweight condition,” concluded the Safety Board.

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