The July 26, 2021 fatal crash of a Bombardier Challenger 605 while attempting a circle-to-land approach in marginal VMC was due to “the first officer’s improper decision to attempt to salvage an unstabilized approach by executing a steep left turn to realign the airplane with the runway centerline, and the captain’s failure to intervene after recognizing the FO’s erroneous action,” according to the NTSB final report published today. The accident near California’s Truckee-Tahoe Airport (KTRK) killed the two pilots and four passengers.
The Safety Board also faulted the flight crew for ignoring stall protection system warnings, which resulted in a left-wing stall and an impact with terrain. Contributing to the accident were the improper deployment of the flight spoilers in an apparent attempt to quickly descend from being too high, but which decreased the airplane's stall margin; the captain’s improper setting up of the circling approach; the flight crew’s “self-induced pressure to perform;” and “poor crew resource management, which degraded their decision-making.”
During the descent to KTRK, an air traffic controller told the pilots to expect the RNAV approach for Runway 20. After the pilots calculated that Runway 20 was too short, instead of requesting the straight-in approach to Runway 11, the captain told the first officer (FO) they could take the Runway 20 approach and circle to land on Runway 11. They did not brief each other about the new clearance, contrary to the descent checklist.
The remaining minutes of the flight exhibited a breakdown of communications, incorrect performance, rushed actions, and “critical errors,” according to the report. For example, the FO commented that they had too much airspeed at the beginning of the approach and then suggested a 360-degree turn to the captain, but the captain never acknowledged the excessive airspeed and refused the turn.
Then after the FO visually identified the airport, he told the captain to make a 90-degree right turn to put the airplane on an approximate heading of 290 degrees, which was parallel to Runway 11. However, the FO told the captain to roll out of the turn prematurely, and the captain stopped the turn on a heading of about 233 degrees, which placed the airplane at an angle 57 degrees left of the downwind course parallel with Runway 11. “As a result of the early rollout, the flight crew established a course that required an unnecessarily tight turning radius.”
On the base leg to the runway and about 25 seconds before impact with the ground, the more experienced FO started to repeatedly ask for control of the airplane, but neither pilot verbalized positive transfer of control, and the Safety Board could not determine who had control of the airplane following these requests.
As the airplane crossed the runway extended centerline while maneuvering toward the runway, the FO noted that the airplane was too high, and one of the pilots fully deployed the flight spoilers, likely to increase the airplane's sink rate. The airspeed at the time was 135 knots, 17 knots above Vref. About seven seconds later, the left bank became steeper, and the stick shaker and stick pusher engaged.
The captain asked the FO, “What are you doing?” and the FO again asked the captain multiple times to “let [him] have the airplane.” The stick shaker and stick pusher then briefly disengaged before engaging again. The airplane then entered a rapid left roll, consistent with a left-wing stall, and impacted terrain.