By early August, the worst Canadian wildfires on record had torched more than 32 million acres, created the most unhealthy air quality ever measured in several North American cities, and spewed more than 25 percent of the globe’s annual carbon dioxide (CO2) output into the atmosphere. Of the more than 1,000 fires burning, nearly 700 were labeled “OC” or out-of-control, charring an area the size of Greece, from Quebec to well north of the Arctic Circle.
Meanwhile, U.S. policymakers are grappling with the new reality of fire seasons that are longer, more volatile, and increasingly destructive. And more frequently, the solution involves more air attacks on fires, especially when they are in the nascent stages and before they can spread.
But policy roadblocks with regard to restricted category aircraft and how the government employs them—either directly or through contractors—potentially stand in the way.
According to the National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC), 31,382 wildfires have burned 1,257,389 acres, well below the 10-year average of 35,011 wildfires and 3,897,571 acres burned at this point in the fire season. But that luck may not hold.
NIFC has warned that dry thunderstorms and hot, dry, and windy conditions have created elevated fire risks in the Western U.S., Texas, the lower Mississippi Valley, and Alaska. Of the more than 500,000 acres ablaze on August 7, only 2,609—in Texas—were classified as “contained” by the NIFC. The clear message: buckle up.
Fighting Wildfires From the Air Now Taken More Seriously
Both the executive branch of government and Congress are taking the growing wildfire threat seriously. In January, the Departments of Agriculture, the Interior, and Homeland Security—through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), released the U.S. Forest Service Wildfire Mitigation and Management Commission's Aerial Equipment Strategy Report.
The Commission's interim report—with more findings due out at the end of September—attempted to evaluate structural and policy barriers to effective aerial firefighting, but noted a lack of coherent data on the topic. A 2017 draft interagency strategy for wildland fire aviation resources has yet to be finalized by the National Interagency Aviation Committee of the National Wildfire Coordinating Group due in part to a lack of aviation performance data. A parallel effort, initiated in 2012 by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), intended to document aircraft use and effectiveness. In all, that study, published in 2020, took eight years to complete but fell short of comprehensively assessing the performance of all aircraft types and functions during the wildland fire response.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has also been vexed in researching the topic, for largely the same reasons. “A common challenge was the lack of information on aircraft performance and effectiveness, primarily because federal agencies did not collect such data (GAO, 2013). As one example, a 2012 study by the Rand Corporation intended to assess the ideal composition of large aircraft for optimal returns on investment in an initial attack. However, the study’s models produced ‘a frustratingly broad range of answers’ due to what it termed ‘fundamental uncertainties in the science and economics of wildland firefighting’ (Rand Corporation, 2012),” the Forest Service Wildfire Mitigation and Management Commission's report noted, referencing GAO's conclusions.
It recommended developing national performance measures designed to assist in determining the optimal number of aircraft; cost comparisons between aviation assets owned by the U.S. Department of Defense, government, and the private sector; making national strategy and program needs primary over cost and procurement considerations; increased funding for aviation training and staffing; and exploration of new technology to reduce staffing demands.
Privately-owned firefighting helicopters are typically contracted for by federal and state governments via either “exclusive-use” or “call-when-needed” contracts. Exclusive -se contracts provide that the aircraft is available exclusively for a set period of time—generally months—and is the more expensive option versus a call-when-needed arrangement, which is the more popular choice. Industry experts believe only 30 percent of contracts are for exclusive use.
While acknowledging “adoption of military surplus aircraft by either agencies or private contractors carries risks and costs that are often overlooked,” the Commission recognized that “military surplus parts and equipment, including aircraft parts, may be beneficial to state and local wildfire agencies and the private contractor wildfire community.”
Military Helicopters Find Themselves Restricted In Civilian Service
That benefit already is being recognized, with an increasing number of surplus military rotorcraft, particularly Boeing CH-47s and Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawks, finding their way onto the civilian market and being operated under FAA restricted category type certification. An estimated 500 Black Hawks already have been disposed of onto the civil market, with the majority of those being flown in the U.S. Former military aircraft are typically operated in the restricted category out of an abundance of caution for public safety, said Brian Beattie, general manager of helicopter operator Croman Corp. and chairman of the aerial firefighting and natural resources working group of Helicopter Association International (HAI).
“When these aircraft got to the end of the production line, they didn’t get an FAA credential, “ Beattie noted. A restricted certificate spells out what the aircraft can and cannot do. Chief among the restrictions: they cannot operate over populated areas, near busy airports, over congested airways, or carry passengers. There was a blanket exemption for emergency operations including firefighting and disaster relief, and exceptions to these rules can be made via filling out FAA's J551 certificate of waiver. For years that process worked fairly well.
Operators could apply for J551s that covered their entire fleets for up to 24 months that were good in all 48 contiguous U.S. states. This made it comparatively easy for operators to move helicopters around in potential service of call-when-needed contracts as these aircraft typically not only handled firefighting but utility missions as well such as long-line logging or construction.
That all changed last year when the FAA enacted a policy, as opposed to a rule, change with regard to J551. Operators now needed to apply for a waiver for each flight 45 days in advance and include a risk assessment for each airport where a stop was planned.
“The policy was rewritten because the FAA felt like there were some operators taking advantage of the situation,” surmised Zac Noble, HAI director of flight operations and maintenance. Specifically, rather than overflying a populated area, certain operators were using their J551s to do utility work within an area. So the FAA clamped down on everyone and now “it is very difficult for anyone to get authorization to overfly densely populated areas,” said Noble.
It didn’t take long for the law of unintended consequences to take hold. When Hurricane Ian hit south Florida in 2022, an operator of a civil Black Hawk was denied a J551 trying to deliver meals ready to eat and drinking water to survivors, he said. The HAI and industry have reached out to the FAA in an attempt to get the policy modified. But for now, going into the apex of wildfire season, it remains in place.
New Legislation Is Coming
Congress has addressed the restricted category issue via the proposed FAA reauthorization legislation and aerial firefighting via Interior Department appropriation bills in both the House and Senate. The House already has passed H.R. 3935, “The Securing Growth and Robust Leadership in American Aviation Act,” which, among other things, directs the FAA administrator within 18 months to produce an interim final rule that requires ground firefighters being transported in restricted category aircraft to be categorized as “essential crewmembers” (thus circumventing the restricted category passenger transport ban); places firefighting aircraft maintenance, inspections, and pilot training under Part 135 at the administrator’s discretion; and exempts firefighting aircraft from noise standards.
However, while the legislation proposes to make it easier to carry firefighting crew, it also counterintuitively seeks to restrict the use of former military aircraft for firefighting. According to the act, it provides that the FAA administrator “shall not enable any aircraft of a type that has been manufactured in accordance with the requirements of, and accepted for use by, any branch of the United States military and has been later modified to be used for wildfire suppression operations.”
And that raises the larger question as to why modern aircraft remain subject to what would seem like draconian FAA restrictions once they leave the military. That likely will be the topic of future debate.
“The FAA recognizes that they’re dealing with a rule and a policy that was developed decades and decades ago when surplus military aircraft weren’t meant to come back from deployments in Europe or Asia,” Noble said. “That’s where those rules came from. But since 1978 the Black Hawk has accumulated more than ten million safe flight hours. There have only been two civilian crashes to date, but yet we’re still held down by those legacy rules.”
Meanwhile, Canada burns, Washington debates, and the nation waits out another fire season—with fingers crossed.