Last year, the FAA released a draft advisory circular (AC 136-B048) that could worsen helicopter tour operator safety in Hawaii instead of doing what the AC is intended to do: improve safety by limiting altitudes below which tour aircraft can fly.
Operators, such as Maverick Helicopters Hawaii in Kahului, expressed concern that the AC’s advice, which is intended to be advisory only, will be incorporated into commercial operators' operations specifications (OpSpecs).
FAA regulations that govern tour operations in Hawaii—Part 136, Appendix A—already specify minimum altitudes, including no flights below 1,500 feet (except for takeoff and landing) or closer than 1,500 feet to any person or property. But operators have been flying under OpSpecs that permitted following a deviation manual first published in 2008, according to Jake Harmon, chief pilot at Maverick Hawaii. “[The FAA is] trying to get rid of that and make it so we can only fly above 1,500 feet unless we encounter unforecast weather,” he explained.
Release of the AC is expected soon, and until then, operators won’t know the final content. However, earlier this year, tour operators met with the FAA to outline their concerns with the AC, especially how the inability to use the 2008 deviation manual will impact safety. “Our expectation was that these were safety concerns, and that the FAA would implement changes,” Harmon told AIN. “They didn’t do anything. They told us, ‘We hear you, but we’re not going to change anything.’”
According to Vertical Aviation International (VAI, formerly HAI), the draft AC outlines operational procedures and processes including pilot training needed when applying for OpSpec letter of authorization (LOA) B048, which covers commercial air tour operations below 1,500 feet above the surface in Hawaii.
The only allowance for flying below 1,500 feet using OpSpec/LOA B048 is “in order to remain in VMC [visual meteorological conditions] and avoid entering unforecasted IMC [instrument meteorological conditions]. This authorization is not intended for flights where forecasted weather conditions would not allow VMC above 1,500 feet.” No allowance is made for deviation from Part 136, Appendix A “and is not intended to authorize operations closer than 1,500 feet to any person or property.”
In other words, operators are invited to create a deviation manual, but it only covers unforecast weather and comes with a bunch of stipulations, according to Harmon. “We can’t even launch on a tour if any part is forecasted where we would be going below 1,500 feet. It’s impossible to gauge that. The only official weather reporting is at the airport. This is a poorly put-together advisory circular. We can’t tell if it’s being rushed through, but there is a lot of pressure from high levels of government [to implement it].”
The specifics of the AC’s recommended operating procedures are fairly stringent. They include:
- Designation of known site-specific areas (KSSAs) where commercial air tour operations can take place.
- Commercial air tour flight profiles, including altitudes, areas, landmarks, and more.
- Transition segments for maneuvering between KSSAs, communication procedures, radio frequencies, and aircraft-lighting recommendations.
- Weather minimums for safe operations below 1,500 feet.
- Safety risk analysis and prohibited operations.
- Reporting points and procedures for unforecasted weather encounters.
Further, the FAA wants each tour aircraft operator to present a list of instruments and equipment installed in the aircraft, including: All equipment required under Section 91.205(d); IFR navigation equipment enabling at least one type of instrument approach procedure; ADS-B In and Out system that provides visual and audible traffic warnings; supplemental type certificates; and minimum equipment lists. The FAA doesn’t seem to acknowledge that few of these tour aircraft are approved for, nor equipped for, IFR flight, nor are the pilots usually IFR-rated. And, while ADS-B Out is mandatory in a lot of airspace, there is no regulatory requirement for ADS-B In equipment and so far most ADS-B In features are advisory only.
Tour pilots would have to undergo ground and flight training including KSSA familiarization flights under supervision. The FAA, as normal, would be able to conduct initial or annual flight observations or designate an approved person to do so. Instructors would have to be qualified to provide this training and keep records of the training and their observations.
All of this will be subject to an FAA authorization process that could see the FAA adding further requirements for equipage, inspection, safety risk analysis, approval of flight training, and acceptance of operating procedures.
Harmon worries that the new AC recommendations, as embodied in OpSpec/LOA B048, would compress the airspace available to tour operators, which could also force them into airspace used by inter-island flights. “The majority of cloud bases are 1,500 to 2,000 feet,” he said. “We’re taking all these aircraft and compressing them into one altitude. That not only makes it not safer; it makes it exponentially less safe.
“What this does is it’s going to force helicopters to fly along the coastline for tours. They won’t be able to fly into the interior [areas that are] uninhabited. It will force us over communities and will increase noise complaints. We will have our hands tied and won’t be able to do anything else. This will have a huge impact on the well-being of people in Hawaii, where 95 percent of people live along the coastline.”
The 2008 deviation manual was created to address these safety issues by allowing tour pilots some latitude when they needed to navigate around weather. Harmon believes that the pressure to create the new restrictions stems from the Dec. 6, 2019, Safari Aviation tour accident, in which the pilot and six passengers died when the helicopter was flown into IMC.
While the processes in place for tour operations haven’t seemed to eliminate inadvertent flight into IMC accidents, this particular accident had more to do with the pilot not complying with regulations.
The NTSB “determined that the probable cause of this accident was the pilot’s decision to continue flight under visual flight rules (VFR) into instrument meteorological conditions (IMC), which resulted in the collision into terrain. Contributing to the accident was Safari Aviation Inc.’s lack of safety management processes to identify hazards and mitigate the risks associated with factors that influence pilots to continue VFR flight into IMC. Also contributing to the accident was the Federal Aviation Administration’s delayed implementation of a Hawaii aviation weather camera program, its lack of leadership in the development of a cue-based weather training program for Hawaii air tour pilots, and its ineffective monitoring and oversight of Hawaii air tour operators’ weather-related operating practices.”
Along with the Safari accident final report, the NTSB made a series of safety recommendations, few of which seem to be addressed by the AC. These include:
- Install the necessary infrastructure in Hawaii to enable continuous radio communication between the pilots of low-flying tour flights and ground support personnel, such as flight service station specialists and company flight support personnel, along the most heavily trafficked air tour routes.
- Implement ADS-B infrastructure improvements in Hawaii, such as additional ADS-B ground stations, that provide adequate coverage to enable real-time flight tracking and traffic advisory services for ADS-B Out- and In-equipped, low-flying air tour aircraft throughout their entire tour routes.
- Require Hawaii air tour operators to install ADS-B Out equipment in their aircraft to enable real-time flight position tracking.
- Require air tour operators to have flight support personnel who are trained to exercise operational control authority, participate in preflight risk analysis, provide pilots with weather briefings, monitor the progress of the flights, and participate in two-way communications with pilots to alert them of any weather hazards.
- Develop guidance for small operators for scaling a safety management system that includes methods and techniques for implementation and specific examples applicable to several operational sectors, including air tours.
- Issue a safety alert for operators to encourage air tour operators to establish safety assurance processes to routinely review recorded onboard videos and automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast flight tracking data, ideally as part of a safety management system with an integrated flight data monitoring program, for the purpose of identifying and addressing risky trends in weather-related operating practices, such as encounters or near encounters with three instrument-meteorological-conditions-related hazards.
- Improve the surveillance of air tour operations in Hawaii through the use of technologies and innovative approaches, including but not limited to comparing automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast flight position data from air tour flights with weather camera imagery for the route and periodically reviewing onboard video recordings, to detect and correct operating practices that may lead to unacceptable weather-related risky behavior.
- Issue and periodically update a special airworthiness information bulletin that lists newly manufactured helicopters that are equipped with features likely to reduce accidents resulting from inadvertent encounters with instrument meteorological conditions, describes retrofit options for helicopters that do not have such equipment, and encourages the voluntary integration of these safety features.
“There is pressure to pass some type of regulation because of the Safari accident in Kauai,” Harmon said. “But [this AC] will make it more dangerous to fly here.”