Remembering GARA 30 Years Later: The Law that Changed the Trajectory of the Industry

By the mid-1980s, the general aviation industry was headed toward a grave and uncertain future. Cessna Aircraft had made the decision to cease piston-aircraft production. Piper Aircraft was headed toward bankruptcy and by 1991 had entered Chapter 11. An industry that in 1979 delivered nearly 18,000 aircraft had dwindled to about 2,500 unit shipments just six years later and 1,300 by 1993. And that was turbine and piston aircraft combined.

While many factors played into this, most fingers pointed to product liability as a chief reason. Simply put, manufacturers could no longer afford the long liability tail left by their 40-plus-year-old machines. That was the backdrop for a nearly decade-long battle that culminated in the 1994 passage of the General Aviation Revitalization Act, or GARA. One of the most significant victories for the industry, it was a massive undertaking in a Congress that had little appetite for product liability reform. However, it was an effort that brought together an interesting mix of House and Senate Democrats and Republicans, the business and general aviation industry, labor, and even the airline community. A few of the key players in this battle shared their stories from the time and/or thoughts on the impact of the legislation, which was signed into law on August 17, 1994, now 30 years ago.

Ed Bolen

Bolen was the legislative aide for then-Sen. Nancy Kassebaum, a tenacious Republican from Kansas who was the architect and driver of the legislation in the Senate. Bolen, whose primary responsibility for the Senator was aviation, worked closely with the then-president of the General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA), the late Ed Stimpson, on the bill in the Senate. Bolen would later succeed Stimpson at the helm of GAMA and is now president and CEO of NBAA.

I joined the Senator’s staff in 1990. She had originally introduced [a general aviation product liability] bill in 1986. My understanding of the history had been that the bill was relatively large and complex and sought to address kind of all the concerns of the general aviation industry. It did not go anywhere in the first three congresses in which it had been introduced.

Then a decision had been made by the manufacturers to boil it all down. [They looked at] what was it that they really wanted, what was it they really needed. And that was a statute of repose—a period where, at some point, the liability and responsibility would not be on the manufacturer; if a plane was above a certain age, its very durability proves that it was not poorly designed and it was not poorly manufactured. That doesn't mean it may not have been improperly operated, improperly maintained, or improperly modified. But if the aircraft has a defect in its design or manufacture, it will evidence itself at some point.

And so the legislation that ultimately became law was just a three-page bill, and it created a statute of repose.

My recollection is that maybe it was first introduced at 12 years, but later was introduced at 15 years and then through negotiations became 18 years. One of our major opponents was Howard Metzenbaum of Ohio [former Senate Democrat]. He was a really fierce opponent of product liability reform in any respect. And, we were trying to negotiate with him. He wanted to take it from 15 years to 18.

We said, “Look, we've gone from 12 to 15. That's a long time.” And he said, “I'm asking you to go from 15 to 18. I'm coming down from infinity.”

So, we ultimately settled on 18, and it passed the Senate first.

Most people thought it would not get out of the Commerce Committee. At the time, [former South Carolina Democrat Sen. Ernest] “Fritz” Hollings was the chair of the committee and [former Kentucky Democrat Sen.] Wendell Ford was the head of the aviation subcommittee. They decided they could go ahead and let it go to the floor because it would never pass the full Senate. And if it did, it wouldn't pass the House. But it got onto the Senate floor.

There was a bill that Fritz Hollings desperately wanted to pass, a manufacturing law. Senator Kassebaum went down and was the first person to offer an amendment to his bill, which was the General Aviation Revitalization Act. Hollings did not want GARA on his bill but agreed to give Senator Kassebaum a vote on her standalone bill. [Senate Minority Leader and Kansas Republican] Bob Dole got it on the floor. We got it past the Senate, and it went over to the House.

In the House, there were two committees that had jurisdiction over it. It needed to get out of the Judiciary Committee, which was chaired by [former Democrat Rep.] Jack Brooks from Texas, and he was adamantly opposed to it.

In this particular Congress, [then-Oklahoma Republican Rep.] Jim Inhofe had introduced and passed a resolution [bringing transparency] for something called a discharge petition, which said if a majority of the House votes to move something out of committee—to discharge it from committee—they could do it. That resolution had passed. It had never been exercised before the General Aviation Revitalization Act.

We were stuck in the Judiciary Committee and [former Kansas Democrat Rep.] Dan Glickman, who served on that committee, challenged his chairman Jack Brooks, and got the discharge petition to get it out of Jack Brooks' committee.

[Then California Democrat and House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Chairman Norman] Mineta and [the House aviation subcommittee chairman and Minnesota Democrat James] Oberstar were big champions in T&I. It ultimately passed the House, and I think everybody thought, “Well, it's not going to be signed into law because the trial lawyers have a lot of sway.”

But at the time, the assistant attorney general was named Frank Hunger. He was a pilot, a passionate pilot, and he had a lot of sway in the White House. He was married to [former Vice President] Al Gore's sister. Ultimately, our bill was supported by labor—the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers had lobbied for it and the assistant attorney general was for it. Ultimately, Clinton wanted to create the jobs, the manufacturing jobs.

The bill was signed into law in the Oval Office on Aug. 17, 1994.

There were lots of things that came together for our bill. One of them was that in the early 1990s, there was the National Commission to Ensure a Strong Competitive Airline Industry. [Former Cessna Aircraft chairman] Russ Meyer served on that commission and, among other things, he became close with the head of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers and was able to have the commission [backing], including labor support.

This was a recognition that the airlines depended on general aviation for training and for maintenance workers. We were the training facility. So, if we were going to have a strong competitive airline industry, we need to have a strong competitive general aviation industry.

It was that connection with labor that was a really big deal. I was not in the room. I was on the Senate side, but I certainly got the reports and I've spent a lot of time with Ed Stimpson and John Goglia [who represented the IAM at the time] as they relayed the story of John pounding the table [during a Judiciary Committee hearing with Brooks], saying, “We want those jobs.” John is a big guy. We know he's got a heart of gold, but he came across as a tough technician from Boston, and him pounding the table saying we want those jobs really seemed to galvanize the House Judiciary Committee.

Then you had this commission that endorsed it and that gave it some momentum. And then, the uniqueness of the situation where you had airplane manufacturers—Piper, Beechcraft, and Cessna—which had been building airplanes in the 1930s, 40s, and 50s and were being routinely sued every time there was an airplane accident.

But they had the ability to say, “Clearly, at some point, the aircraft durability has proven the quality of its design and manufacture.”

We were ultimately winning the lawsuits—the manufacturers were winning the lawsuits. But the average cost of the lawsuit was $500,000 to prove that a plane you built 40 years ago was not poorly manufactured or designed.

You also had the manufacturers that had pulled out. Cessna, as you know, had pulled out of the piston market. Piper was in bankruptcy. No one wanted to buy Piper out of bankruptcy because they didn't know how to value the company because it had this long product liability tail.

We had big champions of this in both the House and the Senate who were totally committed to it. Usually, they were pilots. A couple, for example, that were helpful in the Senate, were Tom Harkin [D] from Iowa and John Kerry [D] from Massachusetts. Harkin was a general aviation pilot. Kerry was a general aviation pilot. [Then-Ohio Democrat Sen.] John Glenn was a supporter and then tremendous support from, obviously, Bob Dole.

There was just a huge amount of support. You had someone in Senator Kassebaum who was very much respected. She was tough. She was thoughtful. She was prepared, and people liked her. And she was tenacious. She found a way to be a very independent person on Capitol Hill who didn't alienate other people. If you think back when she was elected, she was the only woman in the Senate, and so she was someone that everybody knew, everybody watched.

She'd been working to get the bill out of the Commerce Committee for many years. People like Fritz Hollings and Wendell Ford recognized and appreciated how hard she was working to represent her constituency and the deep belief she had in the fairness of the bill. She was someone who was able to work all across the spectrum with other people to present her views.

And so in the Senate, there was kind of a confluence of events.

In the House of Representatives, people like Dan Glickman, of course, Jim Hansen [R] of Utah [who] was a pilot, Norm Mineta, and Jim Oberstar. There were just a lot of people who believed so deeply in aviation.

And then, the entire general aviation community came together. [The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association] really came out strong. There were just a lot of great people, a lot of fortunate circumstances that played out, and support from labor, the pilots that were on Capitol Hill, and the states that had manufacturing.

It was unbelievable that all those years of preparation and then one opportunity after another where it seemed insurmountable, but the bill kept getting over the next hurdle.

The scene [at the White House signing] was magnificent. We were in the Oval Office. Al Gore and Bill Clinton were both in there. Frank Hunger was there. Labor was represented. Senator Kassebaum was there, Jim Hansen, and Dan Glickman [were among the many others.] Stimpson and Phil Boyer were there from AOPA.

We met briefly in the Oval Office and had an opportunity to get around. And a picture was taken. Then we came out of the Oval Office, and Russ Meyer announced that Cessna was going back into piston-aircraft manufacturing and would begin a search immediately for a new location from where it could resume building airplanes.

There are at least three things that happened since GARA.

One of them was that Russ Meyer walked out and said Cessna was going back into the production of single pistons, built a new factory, and has been producing 172s ever since. Piper was able to come out of bankruptcy originally as the New Piper Aircraft company and subsequently, the New has been dropped. You also had the Klapmeier brothers at the time making kits. I think having the statute of repose probably encouraged them to go ahead and introduce a certified airplane. Just in those three companies, you see something pretty profound.

You go behind that, knowing that there's a bright future for aviation; investment and attention have gone into the growth of companies like Garmin. And all of the people who build aircraft, maintain aircraft, and learn to fly on aircraft.

All of that has been pretty spectacular. You see the things that have come forward in the market, whether it's the parachute recovery or some of the investment that has gone into the avionics. General aviation has always been an incubator for new technologies, and I think you can trace that innovation coming up through companies kind of across the board in general aviation since 1994.

It's fundamental to have training aircraft, being able to bring people into general aviation and help bring, facilitate that trade in commerce in every corner of the country with over 5,000 public use aircraft airports.

There were lots of opportunities for everybody to say: “This is too hard. There are too many obstacles. We did our best but it wasn't meant to be.” It was just so much preparation, so much determination, so much tenacity, that eventually all of that and a lot of good fortune came together and we got a product liability bill passed, and people have had jobs and careers and we've had a strong manufacturing base and an impact on our nation's GDP.

I think it's something that I am and everybody that was part of that process is enormously proud to have been part of that. But I think it's the way democracy is supposed to work. It's not supposed to be easy to get a bill passed and through it, the bill changed; it got very focused. It made sense, and in the end, it became law.

It was a huge moment in my life. In my office. I've got two things that sit near me every day. One is a beautiful painting that Ed Stimson's wife [Dorothy] commissioned. It is of a Cessna 172 flying in the backcountry airstrips of Idaho, and the aircraft is November 172ES. Russ Meyer felt so strongly about Ed Stimson's contribution to getting the bill passed that the first 100 aircraft all ended in Stimson's initials, Echo Sierra. When Ed died, I was fortunate to have her give me that painting.

The other is a framed copy of the bill and one of the pens that Bill Clinton used to sign the legislation.

Dan Glickman

Former Rep. Glickman (D-Kansas) represented Wichita and was the driver to getting product liability reform through the House. In a twist of irony, Glickman lost his re-election after he championed the bill, but was later selected by then-President Bill Clinton to become Secretary of Agriculture. “My life work worked out just fine. I have no regrets whatsoever,” he told AIN. Glickman, who wrote his memoir: “Laughing at Myself: My Education in Congress, on the Farm, and at the Movies,” has remained active serving on multiple boards and consultancies such as the Bipartisan Policy Center, APCO Worldwide, and the Aspen Institute.

Looking at this period of toxic partisanship we're in today, it’s hard to believe that we once passed a major piece of product liability reform legislation affecting the aviation industry on a bipartisan basis. Just imagine that.

On an amazingly bipartisan basis, Congress decided that our liability laws affecting small airplane manufacturers needed to be revised to bring a rule of reason into the whole litigation system as it affected small airplanes because that system was having a devastating effect on the general aviation industry.

What this legislation did was to recognize some reasonable limits to liability when an airplane had a catastrophe—and it was reasonable and it was actually quite effective.

Not everybody supported it—such as the trial lawyers. But the bill did not go after them either. It was a way to try to provide some limits on liability without taking away the rights of people who were legitimately hurt by gross negligence.

Without this help, a lot of these companies would probably not have made it. It was, of course, very big to the Wichita community where I was from.

First of all, it had big grassroots support. You found people all over the country who had friends and business colleagues in the small airplane world, a lot of companies that had small airplanes in rural communities. It was extensive lobbying that occurred all over the country and in Republican and Democrat districts.

But in this case, the grassroots support was strong enough that we had over 300 sponsors of the legislation in the House, which was enough to get us to the floor through all sorts of parliament maneuvers.

In the [House] Judiciary Committee, there's no question there was a tendency to support the trial lawyer's position on most liability issues. And I had a hurdle to deal with: [Chairman] Jack Brooks of Texas, who often carried the water for the trial lawyers.

We weren't getting any action from the chairman. He was blocking this bill. I was on the committee, and I filed a discharge petition. This is now much more frequently used, but back then you never really filed a discharge petition—which was a way to bypass the committee—especially if you were a member of the majority party. It was like a sacrilegious thing to do, but I didn't have any choice.

So, I filed a discharge petition. You needed 218 signatures. When I got to 216 names, I went to Mr. Brooks and said: “I'm going to get the 218. Why don't you go ahead and mark up the bill and send it to the floor?” And that's what he did.

There was no way that he could stop us even if he wanted to because of the vast grassroots support. The International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM) was very instrumental in counteracting the trial lobby. Both of these were traditional Democratic constituencies. The machinists’ union represented the thousands of workers in the aircraft industry—heavily in Wichita, but not just in Wichita. They had Seattle, they had Southern California. But the small airplane business tended to be a focus at that time in Wichita, and they were very strong supporters. So, that was another factor in getting a lot of Democrats to not be too vigorous in their opposition to the bill.

I also had the support of the then-Speaker of the House Tom Foley, who was from Spokane, Washington, and who encouraged me to be vigorous in my zest to get this bill through Congress. I had the power of numbers, frankly, helping me.

Cessna’s chairman Russ Meyer was one of the folks that was the most instrumental in its passage. He was very strong, pushing this bill the whole way through it. A lot of his colleagues in both GAMA and NBAA were also very active. The executives were just terrific to work with. They were really kind of working in my office, almost like they were staffers. If something didn't work, they said, “Well, let's try this.”

But after the bill was passed, Cessna shortly thereafter announced the opening of its single-engine plane assembly line in Independence, Kansas. It's one of the few cases where we actually had an immediate tangible impact from a piece of legislation—in this case, a plant opening and the creation of jobs. I think it was over 1,000 jobs. It may have been more than that.

So, I think GARA both substantively and psychologically really kind of inspired the industry, which was going through somewhat of a funk in terms of production issues, jobs, and related issues.

We got this bill passed, and it created a spark of excitement in that industry. There's been other legislative moves [affecting the industry] that occurred thereafter, long after I left the Congress.

But GARA was a powerful boost to the business. It was also a symbol that the trial lawyers didn't have a monopoly on all legislative items affecting product liability.

I and others have used this bill as a kind of an example of what you can do to establish reasonable product liability protection.

The Democrats controlled Congress through the GARA debates. We were not the biggest supporters of product liability legislation generally. The nice thing about this bill is labor and the industry worked together. It was, this is a case of great collaboration, and again, bipartisan support, which is very important.

I lost my election after [the passage of GARA] but my life work worked out just fine. I have no regrets whatsoever.

I had more fun in that legislation working with all these private pilots around the United States, working with small towns and rural areas that needed general aviation, and working with the industry.

Now watching the Congress, I look at all the controversy, and I think, “Do these people have fun anymore?”

Greg Principato

Principato recently retired as president and CEO of the National Aeronautic Association after a long career that also had him heading up the National Association of State Aviation Officials and Airports Council International-North America. He began his career in politics working in the offices of then Sens. J. Bennett Johnston (D-Louisiana) and Joe Biden (D-Delaware), and also of the governor of Virginia. But he broadened into the aviation realm when he led a panel, the National Commission to Ensure a Strong Competitive Airline Industry, which had a little-remembered but key role in the passage of GARA.

This year marks the 30-year anniversary of the signing of GARA. By general consensus, this legislation truly saved a key part of our aviation manufacturing base. When the GARA was signed, for example, only 500 piston aircraft were being sold each year in the U.S., down from 13,000 annually from 1965 through 1982.

In many ways, the success of GARA is taken for granted. It is seen as something that made eminent sense; why would it not pass?

Two visionary leaders—Cessna CEO Russ Meyer and GAMA president Ed Stimpson—put together a proposal and waited for the right time to strike. That time arrived in 1993 with the formation of the National Commission to Ensure a Strong Competitive Airline Industry.

To outsiders, this seemed odd. The commission was empaneled largely because of the bankruptcies of Pan Am, Eastern, and Braniff, as well as the troubles faced by McDonnell Douglas. The name of the commission hinted that general aviation manufacturing was not likely to be a major topic, or a topic at all.

Ninety days were allotted for the commission’s work, signaling the urgency felt by many because of the airline bankruptcies. The formation of the commission was major news; in the end, the vast majority of its 18 meetings were televised by C-SPAN. The recommendations were sure to be taken seriously.

The 15 members were selected by congressional leaders of both parties and President Clinton. Meyer approached his friend, Senator Bob Dole, the Republican leader of the Senate, and successfully secured one of Dole’s two nominations to the commission.

This was the opportunity he and Stimpson had been waiting for.

Still, the odds seemed high. President Clinton was seen as an ally of the trial lawyers and had five selections on the Commission. Democrats who were in the majority in Congress, and also close to the trial lawyers, selected six of the 10 members picked by congressional leaders.

The chair was a former Democratic governor of Virginia who was a friend of the President’s, Gerald L. Baliles. The executive director—me—did not at that time have much of a history in aviation.

Undaunted, Meyer and Stimpson launched their plan. There was a series of early conversations the chair and I had with each member. He asked each his or her top priority. Meyer said his urgent priority was the need for a 15-year statute of repose on general aviation aircraft.

Meyer explained that because of lawsuits filed against manufacturers on aircraft as old as 20, 30, 40, and even 50 years old, Cessna had stopped making those aircraft. There was still a demand for them, and general aviation provided a jumping-off point for commercial and military aviation. It was, he argued, a strategic economic and technological priority for the U.S. to act to save this critical industry. A 15-year statute of repose seemed more than sufficient to establish that a particular airplane was manufactured properly.

After researching the concept of a statute of repose, Chairman Baliles and I spent some time considering and speaking with others about the implications of such a change. We quickly saw this was not some kind of subsidy program cloaked as “industrial policy.” We understood this recommendation, if adopted, could help revive an entire industry and put thousands back to work. This was, in its simplest form, applied common sense.

Now came the harder part.

First, we needed to convince the 13 other commission members that this was important. Likely few, if any, even knew about this issue. Part of the long series of hearings and educational sessions we held focused on the issue of aircraft manufacturing, and we made sure a light was shining on this. There seemed no opposition within the commission.

That’s when we heard from Capitol Hill.

I fielded a lot of calls from unhappy Democratic staffers. One such call was from a senior member of the Commerce Committee staff who called at home and yelled at me, saying the commission had no mandate to even touch this issue, and product liability was a “no go” zone. I referred him to our enabling statute that required we make recommendations to foster a healthy and competitive U.S. aircraft manufacturing industry. This was clearly an issue meeting this standard. I did this often.

Meanwhile, Chairman Baliles was working to assure members of both houses of Congress that this was an important matter, worthy of their consideration. After all, the commission had no authority to make policy, only to recommend it.

The 15-year statute of repose was included in our final report. Now came the hardest part: Democrats on the Hill, who were close to the trial lawyers, pushed back hard. Since they had the majority, it left a steep hill to climb. The fact that a high-profile presidential commission was led by a high-profile Democrat (Governor Baliles) and a Democratic executive director (me) meant little to those Hill leaders. I worked hard with White House staff to try to gather support. (It must be said that Democratic Congressman Dan Glickman and his very able staffer Sherry Ruffing were also in the trenches once the proposal got to the Hill).

This massive hurdle was cleared for good when Governor Baliles reached out to his friend, President Clinton. Governor Baliles made the case for this proposal, in essence, from one governor to another. Any good governor would do anything possible to open factories in their state and create those jobs. Baliles told Clinton that, by supporting this legislation, we had a commitment from the chairman and CEO of Cessna that a factory would be opened right away if this was passed and signed. And that others would follow.

President Clinton agreed to support the legislation. Stimpson worked his magic on the Hill. Democrats made the final legislation an 18-year statute of repose. Meyer followed through on his commitment to re-open the factory. The rest is history.

It is said success has a thousand parents. The successful passage and application of this statute is due to the work of so many people. It has been so successful that many take it for granted. At the time, though, it seemed an almost impossible task.

But a sensible proposal had been developed. Russ Meyer and Ed Stimpson sensed the time was right. Governor Baliles and I were willing to endure months of angry reaction from friends on the Hill. Baliles hit on the perfect argument to make to the President to gain his support. A small, needed compromise was made to get the bill over the finish line.

This inside story has been little told over the years. Some participants have passed away, and all have moved on in one way or another. The law has been so successful, my guess is that most who opposed it at the time would shy away from admitting it now. GAMA’s year-end general aviation production numbers—4,070 in 2023 according to the latest report—show just how successful it has been.

It is always worth remembering that good things are oftentimes difficult to achieve. Sometimes, strange alliances are needed and can develop. Sometimes the answer to angry, insistent, powerful people needs to be “No, you’re wrong, we are going to do this.”

Russ Meyer

Russell W. Meyer, a former Yale and Harvard Law School graduate, led Cessna Aircraft for 32 years and to this day remains chairman emeritus and remains active in the industry, including with the CitationPartners. He also chaired the General Aviation Manufacturers Association three times and was called by Rep. Dan Glickman a “seminal figure” in the passage of GARA. His leadership at both Cessna Aircraft and within the industry earned him the Wright Brothers Memorial Trophy, as well as a place in the National Aviation Hall of Fame. Meyer spoke with AIN about how deeply meaningful the legislation was to him. Almost as an epilogue, he shared a few thoughts about its impact.

Although the industry celebrated the somewhat miraculous enactment of GARA 30 years ago, I’m not sure that anyone fully recognized the immensely positive impact this legislation would have on general aviation. Think about this. The escalating and incalculable cost of product liability essentially killed the production of single-engine propeller aircraft. During the 25 years from 1960 to 1985, the industry averaged the delivery of about 7,500 propeller aircraft per year. In fact, as recently as 1977 to '78, the industry delivered more than 18,000 aircraft in both those years.

Cessna was by far the largest producer of single-engine aircraft. We routinely produced at least 50% of industry deliveries, including the highly popular 152, 172, and 182. Solely because of the cost of product liability, we had no choice but to stop producing any single-engine aircraft in 1986. It was without question the most difficult decision in my long career in aviation.

Talk about bringing an important industry back to life! During our testimony at all four Congressional hearings, Cessna committed to starting the production of single-engine propeller aircraft immediately after GARA was enacted. The bill was passed in August of 1994. In December of that year, we broke ground on a totally new production facility in Independence, Kansas. We were proud to deliver the first new 172s in 1996. We subsequently added the 182 and 206.

Importantly, other companies are also producing single-engine aircraft. As a result, the industry has been able to support the increasing requirements of flight training. The requirement to train new aviators will continue to increase. Without GARA and the production of new single-engine aircraft, we could never have met those requirements.

The General Aviation Manufacturers Association has tracked airplane deliveries for decades. Its numbers tell a story of the passage of GARA: “The total count of deliveries inclusive from 1994 through 2023 is 43,446 piston airplanes, 13,481 turboprops, and 20,705 business jets for a total GA airplane delivery count of 77,632 units. We’ve also got 2,293 S-LSA, and similar ASTM-approved piston airplanes since 2009 in our report. Airplane value delivered: $504 billion.”