Loss of control in-flight (LOC-I) is the leading cause of fatal aircraft accidents worldwide. These accidents affect every aircraft type and every segment of aviation. Startle, surprise, and the psychophysiological effects of an aircraft upset can paralyze a pilot’s response unless they are properly trained.
Unlike past killers in aviation, the LOC-I threat persists on any flight, at any time, and pilots can have only a few seconds to initiate the proper flight control inputs to safely recover from an aircraft upset. If mismanaged, an in-flight upset can quickly escalate into a LOC-I event where the pilot is unable to recover from an unintended extreme deviation from the expected flight path due to either a lack of skill, altitude, or time, leading to a serious incident or fatal crash.
Put into context, according to Boeing’s annual statistical summary of aircraft accidents, LOC-I accidents top the list of fatal accidents in airliners. Fatalities from LOC-I accidents nearly outnumber the next three categories combined. Over the last decade, worldwide LOC-I accidents have killed 428 people, compared with 459 killed from bird strikes, system component failure (non-powerplant), and runway excursions combined.
In general aviation, 40% of all accidents are attributed to LOC-I, making it the leading killer. In fact, the next six accident categories combined do not top LOC-I as a leading cause of fatal accidents. Alarmingly, a loss-of-control accident involving a general aviation aircraft occurs once every four days, with most of these crashes being fatal.
According to the AOPA Air Safety Institute, nearly 90% of all loss-of-control accidents occur during takeoff, initial climb, or during approach and landing. All near the ground with little to no time to recover.
The NBAA Safety Committee has identified LOC-I as a “top safety focus.” Classified as a preventable accident type, the Safety Committee recommends improved in-flight upset prevention, recognition, and recovery skills through advanced training such as a comprehensive upset prevention and recovery training (UPRT) program.
Airline UPRT Mandate
UPRT programs were mandated for airline pilots in the U.S. in March 2019. These programs use a full-flight simulator certified for extended envelope training. After a series of airline accidents where investigators identified inappropriate pilot responses to an in-flight upset event due to training deficiencies and a lack of fundamental piloting skills, these programs were required.
Three of the LOC-I accidents that led to the mandate are listed below. Each was attributed to inappropriate actions by airline pilots, which led to an aerodynamic stall and subsequent crash. Combined, these accidents killed 287 people.
Colgan Air 3407. On Feb. 12, 2009, a Bombardier Q400 crashed in Buffalo, New York, killing all 49 passengers and crew onboard and one person on the ground. The NTSB determined the probable cause as the pilot’s inappropriate response to stall warnings. Those actions led to a loss of control in-flight.
Turkish Airlines 1951. On Feb. 25, 2009, a Boeing 737-800 crashed short of the runway in Amsterdam, killing nine passengers and crew. Dutch investigators determined that a faulty radar altimeter caused the autothrottle system to reduce the engine thrust to idle. The crew was late in recognizing the reduction in thrust and loss of airspeed, and the aircraft stalled and crashed.
Air France 447. On June 1, 2009, an Airbus A330-200 on a scheduled flight from Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, to Paris Charles de Gaulle Airport crashed into the Atlantic Ocean, killing all 228 passengers and crew onboard. French investigators concluded that temporary inconsistencies between airspeed measurements—likely caused by ice crystals obstructing the pitot tubes—caused the autopilot to disconnect. The flight crew reacted incorrectly, causing the aircraft to enter an aerodynamic stall, which the pilots failed to correct.
Of interest, in each of these cases, an aerodynamic stall ultimately led to a loss of aircraft control. Yet often, the cause of these accidents is misidentified or associated with other unrelated issues.
The Colgan Air accident is often associated with pilot fatigue or airframe icing (neither was identified as a probable cause by the NTSB); the Turkish 737 accident is related to automation and a faulty radar altimeter; and the cause of the Air France 447 accident is often related to unreliable airspeed indications or faulty air sensor probes.
Past Killers
During the 1990s, controlled flight into terrain (CFIT), windshear, and midair collisions were identified as leading causes of fatal aircraft accidents. Following each accident, there was a level of public outrage that a perfectly good aircraft could fly into a mountain, get knocked out of the sky by a thunderstorm, or crash into another aircraft without warning.
In 1997, the FAA’s Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) was formed to reduce the number of fatal accidents in commercial aviation. Together, safety agencies, regulators, industry, and labor unions worked to curb the negative trend of fatal accidents.
These efforts led to enhanced training and safety programs and technology innovations such as terrain awareness warning systems, windshear detection and alerting systems, and traffic collision avoidance systems. These technological advances helped reverse negative trends in these categories.
For several decades, LOC-I accidents have been identified as the number-one killer in aviation. Other than the UPRT mandate for airline pilots in 2019, there has been a lack of urgency to address the issue by safety organizations and regulators.
The NTSB stopped publishing its “Most Wanted List for Safety Improvements” in 2023. LOC-I for general aviation was included on this list from 2015 to 2018. Since then, LOC-I—even though it is the leading killer in aviation—has not been included on the NTSB list of safety issues.
LOC-I accidents are largely the result of a skill-based error. To mitigate the LOC-I threat, the industry must focus on improving safety through enhanced training programs such as UPRT. Technological solutions, including fly-by-wire systems and flight envelope protection, do not provide ample protection when operating in a degraded mode.
Thus, it is incumbent on the aircraft operator to properly implement an initial and recurrent UPRT program that employs industry best practices, qualified UPRT instructors, an integrated program, high-level intensity, and purpose-built training devices (aircraft and/or simulators).
The opinions expressed in this column are those of the author and are not necessarily endorsed by AIN Media Group.