Flap Setting, Checklist Failure Led to Hawker Excursion

The National Transportation Safety Board cited “the flight crew’s failure to properly configure the airplane for takeoff in a high-density altitude environment” as the probable cause of a July 20, 2024 runway excursion by a Hawker 900XP during an aborted takeoff at Telluride Regional Airport (KTEX) in Colorado. The NTSB’s final report listed the crew’s failure to use checklists as a contributing factor; the analysis noted that the crew also departed with a quartering tailwind of 12 knots gusting to 17, exceeding the airplane flight manual’s (AFM) 10-knot maximum. The lower fuselage sustained substantial damage, but no one was injured.

KTEX is at 9,069 feet msl on a 1,000-foot mesa, surrounded by rising, mountainous terrain. The aircraft, N526FC, had arrived earlier that day, landing on Runway 9, and unloaded passengers; the accident flight was a positioning return to Miami Executive Airport (KTMB) without passengers, and the right seat pilot was in command. The FAA Chart Supplement for KTEX at the time of the accident recommended Runway 27 for takeoff and Runway 9 for landing.

Performance calculations on 7,111-foot Runway 27, which the crew selected for departure, showed that 6,800 to 6,900 feet would be needed with flaps at 15 degrees. Airplane maintenance records indicated the airplane weighed approximately 24,374 pounds at the time of the accident. “According to the FAA-approved AFM, for a field pressure altitude of 9,000 feet, a takeoff weight of 24,000–25,000 lbs, and an outside air temperature of 20°C, the runway length needed for takeoff would have been 6,448–7,035 ft with 15° flaps. For a field pressure altitude of 9,000 ft, a takeoff weight of 24,000–25,000 lbs, and an outside air temperature of 20°C, the runway length needed for takeoff would have been 7,912–9,308 ft with 0° flaps,” the report noted.

The estimated density altitude at the time of the accident was 11,244 feet msl, approximately 2,175 feet above field elevation. The NTSB noted that the crew attempted to depart with a tailwind component that exceeded the AFM operational limitation. Video footage showed a windsock oriented eastward throughout the takeoff roll and aborted takeoff. Approximately four minutes before the accident, the AWOS reported winds from 120 degrees at 12 knots, gusting to 17 knots.

The NTSB found that “during the startup, taxi, and attempted takeoff from Runway 27, there was no discussion of checklist usage or configuration settings for the airplane.” The AFM required flaps set before takeoff and a “FATS – Checks flaps, airbrakes, trims, and V speeds” at lineup. Corporate Air Charters’ checklist matched both requirements.

Halfway down the runway, the airplane had not reached 75% of its planned takeoff speed, and the pilot flying elected to abort. The crew applied the brakes, air brakes, and thrust reversers, but the airplane, according to the pilot, “wasn’t slowing down.” It veered right, crossed the airport’s engineered material arresting system (EMAS), and came to rest approximately 150 feet from the runway threshold, partly in a field.

The pilots attempted to shut down both engines by closing the high-pressure and low-pressure fuel flow controls; “however, the engines continued to operate.” Airport personnel disconnected the airplane’s batteries in a second attempt to stop the engines after the crew exited the aircraft, also without success. “The engines finally stopped after the pilot manually adjusted the fuel control unit” under telephone guidance from a mechanic, via the power lever angle. There was no fire or explosion.

The NTSB noted that the AFM contains no guidance for engine shutdown in a scenario where the standard shutdown procedures and emergency evacuation procedures fail, and that no such guidance is required by the FAA. Post-accident download of the two Honeywell N1 digital electronic engine control units confirmed both engines had been operating and responding to power lever inputs throughout the takeoff roll and the accident sequence.

After egressing, the pilot noticed the flaps were fully retracted. Post-accident examination confirmed, “the flap handle and the flap mechanical indicator on the pedestal were found in the fully up position (0°).”

The accident echoes a May 2014 Gulfstream IV overrun at Hanscom Field in Bedford, Massachusetts, in which seven people died after the crew departed with the gust lock engaged. The NTSB cited “habitual noncompliance with checklists” as a contributing factor and, as AIN has reported, safety researchers have identified attitude and cognitive automation as primary barriers to checklist compliance.