AINsight: Go-arounds Are a Normal and Expected Outcome

Earlier this month, the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) issued a safety notice warning aircraft operators and pilots about an unacceptable rise in unstable approaches that continue to land rather than go around. The regulator, citing historical data, said this practice makes a subsequent adverse event 80 to 100 times more likely.

Safety Notice SN-2026/008 “sets out the actions that operators are expected to take within their operational, safety management, and training systems to reduce the incidence of unstable approaches continued to landing and to reinforce the go-around as a normal, expected, and well-practiced response.”

A stabilized approach is a well-established defense against approach and landing accidents. The practice is effective at reducing runway excursions, hard landings, tail strikes, and runway contact events.

However, according to the CAA, data from mandatory occurrence reports and operator safety data indicated a concerning negative trend. The regulator acknowledged the fact that an unstable approach does not always result in a negative outcome; in many cases, these approaches that continue without a go-around conclude with an uneventful landing.

“This is precisely why the practice is so insidious,” the CAA said. “The absence of a negative outcome on any individual occasion can be misread by crews and organizations as evidence that the margin was acceptable.” 

Historical data from the Flight Safety Foundation indicates that unstable approaches are a factor in two-thirds of approach and landing accidents. The CAA’s own data from 2024 to 2025 concluded that “an approach which is continued in an unstable condition is 80 to 100 times more likely to result in a subsequent adverse event.” Common adverse events include hard or deep landings and tail strikes. Unstable approaches are frequently cited as causal or contributing factors in runway excursions, making them a global safety concern.

Captain’s Authority

For pilots, the safety notice is clear: “When the defined stability criteria are not met, the go-around is the normal and expected outcome.” 

The CAA is careful not to undermine the authority of the captain: “The aircraft commander retains the final authority for the safe conduct of the flight and may, in specific circumstances, determine that continuing to a landing is the safer course of action than initiating a go-around.” However, according to the notice, “operators must ensure that this authority is correctly understood by all flight crew.”

Justification to continue an unstable approach, according to the regulator, should be supported by “a specific, identifiable hazard that makes a go-around a greater risk on that occasion.” Examples include an aircraft system condition, a performance limitation, or the relative position of other aircraft outside of normal flight paths.

Unacceptable reasons for continuing an unstable approach to a landing include a lack of confidence in flying a go-around (unease in the maneuver), commercial or schedule pressure, or the perception that a go-around is an abnormal or undesirable event.

Operations in busy airspace are a common reason cited by pilots for the continuation of an unstable approach. According to the CAA, this is an unacceptable excuse since ATC procedures are designed to accommodate a go-around. Again, a go-around should be considered a normal procedure for pilots and ATC alike. 

Standard Operating Procedures

The agency added that “operator standard operating procedures (SOPs) should set out clear, unambiguous criteria for a stabilized approach, including the parameters to be met and the gates (defined by heights above the airport) by which those criteria must be satisfied.” These gates are often defined by weather conditions, either VMC or IMC (for example, 500 or 1,000 feet agl, respectively). The CAA hints that meteorological conditions do not directly affect the energy state of the aircraft; establishing a lower gate for a visual approach may “create a higher risk of an unstable, rushed approach, with more time pressure on the go-around.”

One caution, according to the regulator, is to “make it clear in their SOPs, that stability is not a one-time check at the gates.” The approach requires continuous monitoring for stability all the way to touchdown.

At a minimum, SOPs should address these two questions: What constitutes an acceptable transient (momentary) deviation during which the approach may continue? And what must be called unstable and treated as a go-around trigger?

Per the CAA safety notice, “SOPs should define clear, standard calls for the monitoring pilot to make when a parameter is deviating, and for when the stability criteria are no longer met and go-around is required.” Accordingly, “this should include the expected response, so that the call and the action are unambiguous for both crew members.” (Examples: a pilot monitoring calling “500 feet, stable,” with the pilot flying responding “continuing,” or pilot monitoring calling “500 feet, unstable,” with pilot flying responding “go-around.”)

Final Thoughts

The CAA safety notice identifies unstable approaches continuing to land as a persistent issue that affects aviation safety. The uptick in these events was described as a “concerning trend.”

The reality is the lack of go-arounds from unstable approaches is a decades-old problem. FAA ASIAS data has historically shown a lack of compliance in go-arounds from unstable approaches. The fact that only 3% to 5% of unstable approaches result in a go-around—meaning 95% to 97% continue to land—is problematic.

The CAA safety notice places an emphasis on a go-around as a normal and expected outcome of an unstable approach. This is sound advice. 

A go-around is not an “emergency,” and any professional pilot should be confident and comfortable flying the maneuver. In addition, a pilot’s decision to go around must be supported by unambiguous SOPs and a no-fault go-around policy.

Absent from the CAA’s analysis is a discussion about those flight crews that continue the unstable approach and land. Outside of those exceptional circumstances specifically defined by the CAA (a hazard that makes the go-around a greater safety risk), there are very few legitimate reasons to continue an unstable approach to a landing.

Deviating from established SOPs is a slippery slope and is indicative of either intentional noncompliance, a breakdown in crew resource management, or a failure of leadership by the pilot-in-command. The potential negative consequences of continuing an unstable approach far outweigh the favorable outcomes of a go-around.